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The Billion Dollar Decision:
Is Deepsea Mining A Prudent Investment?
LEIGH S. RATINER*
AND
REBECCA L. WRIGHT**
I. INTRODUCTION
Mining companies are accustomed to taking risks. The nature of
the business requires the investment of enormous sums of capital to
develop an ore deposit years before production will ever be brought
to the marketplace. By that time, the volatile metals markets may
have experienced wide price swings which can reduce the financial
returns on the project below acceptable levels and can, indeed, even
wipe out the investment made earlier. Sometimes a project requires
many millions of dollars in research and development expenditures on
new mining technologies or processing methods before commercial
recovery can begin; the mining company must assume the risk that
this new technology will not prove economically feasible.
Land miners in the United States can locate mineral deposits and
secure clear legal rights to develop them, and only then are they
faced with technological and, ultimately, market risks. Usually, these
technical risks are manageable, because relatively little technology of
a pioneering nature is involved.
Ocean miners, however, are in a fundamentally different posi-
tion. The attempt to locate a deposit in the oceans requires the de-
velopment of new techniques for prospecting never before used in
the mining industry. Once a deposit is identified, pioneering technol-
ogy must be developed to recover minerals from three miles beneath
the sea's surface and to extract metals from ore never before proces-
sed. Because the technological risks are novel, feasibility studies for
an ocean mine must go well beyond what the land miner would be
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required to prove to justify an initial investment, and the location of a
seabed deposit, because of the large extent of the deposits, is neces-
sarily a somewhat lesser component of determining overall feasibility
than would be true for a land-based deposit. Of equally serious con-
cern, the ocean miner under present law cannot acquire universally-
recognized rights to the deposit. Metals-rich manganese nodules are
not found within any nations's territorial or resource jurisdiction.
Under the international law of the freedoms of the high seas, which is
not unanimously accepted by other nations as being applicable to
deep seabed mineral resources, the ocean miner has the legal right to
recover nodules, but he may not have the right to exclude other par-
ties from mining the same deposit. These latter, "exclusive" rights
can only be clearly assured through not yet concluded multilateral or
bilateral agreements among nations.
But, even if the ocean miner accepts all of these risks which his
land mining colleagues do not face, he confronts one further risk-
the risk that well-intentioned diplomats will write a new body of law
to govern his investment after he has made it. And he has no assur-
ance that the new body of law will not prohibit him from recouping
his investment, not to mention earning a reasonable return.
Grappling with these uncertainties, the ocean miner must be
continually alert to the every-changing political climate of the future.
Capital expenditures for research and development, prospecting, and
exploration can be justified so long as there remains a reasonable
chance that the political and legal climate will one day justify the
decision to commercialize the investment. At some point, however,
the ocean miner must become sufficiently confident of the political
future as to make the final decision on whether to invest in excess of
a billion dollars. As preparations are made for this decision, each of
the variables are analyzed in a continuing process. During the in-
terim, the extent to which corporations can commit further funds to
ocean mining will be a function of their assessment of these variables
in combination. If at some point the technology, the political future,
and the markets all look unfavorable, even modest capital programs
will be terminated. Today, the situation for ocean miners can be
summarized as follows: The technology looks feasible; the markets are
poor but are likely to improve significantly in the mid-1980's; and the
political future is dismal.
The purpose of this article is to explain how one reaches the
conclusion that the political future is dismal, in as careful and precise
a manner as possible. The political future for ocean mining is still
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being created. The law has yet to be written, and the rules and regu-
lations do not exist. If the 150 nations which have been attempting to
write that law for over ten years can understand why deepsea mining
is unlikely to occur under the scheme they have developed, they still
have an opportunity to repair it.
Much has been said about the competing policy objectives at
stake in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Statements are frequently heard from responsible American public
officials that our national interest in the development of secure
supplies of seabed minerals is only one among a variety of important
national interests to be served by the emerging law of the sea treaty.
In truth, such statements are usually a euphemism for the willingness
of some to accept a treaty that effectively forestalls any deepsea min-
ing, or at least creates a very poor investment climate for deepsea
mining, if they can attain other objectives which they consider to be
of a higher priority. This article will not deal with the question of
such priorities. Instead, it focuses on the much narrower issue of
whether deepsea mining can occur under the legal regime presently
contemplated by the draft law of the sea treaty.
The problem is best explained by the old adage--"you can lead
a horse to water, but you can't make him drink." Indeed, no matter
how thirsty the horse may be, if he is certain the water is poisoned,
he may take his chances on finding another trough. There are many
other attractive investment opportunities for the mining industry, and
thus the probability is virtually non-existent that ocean miners will
assume substantial political risks under any future regime. While
most lawmakers are keenly sensitive to the fact that the laws they
make must be minimally suitable to their constituencies, it is by no
means clear that the delegates to the Law of the Sea Conference have
yet acknowledged this phenomenon. As is demonstrated by an
analysis of the present draft treaty articles, there is a glaring inconsis-
tency between the prerequisites for private investment in deepsea
mining and the political environment which would evolve under the
new regime. This inconsistency can only mean that the resources of
the deep seabed, the so-called "common heritage of mankind," may
never become metals in the marketplace to benefit consumers nor
generate revenues to benefit the lesser developed nations. And this
result would be directly contrary to the economic interests of the
international community as a whole. It would be entirely supportive,
however, of the economic interests of a small group of countries who
produce these same minerals on land.
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These countries know quite well that a stable international
investment climate is required before ocean mining can proceed, and
they have successfully managed over the more than ten years of this
Conference to prevent a treaty that could provide this stability from
being finalized. By escalating their demands in the negotiation, they
have effectively discouraged ocean mining, which they believe may
one day compete with the raw materials they themselves produce.
The success of this small group of countries has been phenomenal.
Not only have they deterred ocean mining by preventing agreement
on a treaty regime, but they have simultaneously ensured that the
treaty drafted by the Conference would itself deter the development
of these resources, even if the industrialized countries with an
economic stake in ocean mining were, as a result of their perception
of the balance of national interests involved in the Conference over-
all, ever prepared to sign it. As long as the negotiations continue,
these mineral producing countries will benefit from the investment
uncertainty for ocean mining created by the negotiations. And, if the
negotiations result in a treaty like the one now pending before the
Conference, this deterrent to ocean mining will have been memo-
rialized.
For this handful of countries, the only threat to their economic
interest is the risk that the ocean mining investment climate may be
stabilized by the actions of industrialized countries independent of
the Law of the Sea Conference. Until now, they have believed that
the industrialized countries would sign virtually any treaty to avoid
having to establish an alternative investment climate through mea-
sures strenuously opposed as a matter of principle and ideology by
the Third World. That belief may now be shaken by the rapid prog-
ress of the United States, Federal Republic of Germany, United
Kingdom, Netherlands, France, Belgium, and others toward the
enactment of reciprocal legislation creating that much-needed
stabilized investment climate.
It is sometimes argued by well-meaning but non-expert followers
of the law of the sea that, through legislation, the United States and
others are about to make an unprecedented land grab on the bottom
of the oceans. In fact, the more persuasive argument is that this
handful of countries, producing on land the same metals as are likely
to come from the sea, are the land grabbers: they would seize control
of the deep seabed for the purpose of limiting its usefulness to man-
kind. Needless to say, the overwhelming majority of people in the
world consume these raw materials and do not produce them. While
it can be argued that industrialized countries benefit the most from
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the ready availability of raw materials at competitive prices, the major
beneficiaries will also include those Third World countries who seek
to industrialize their economies.
To explain why the minerals-producing countries have been so
influential in the deep seabed negotiations to date would require a
detailed assessment of the evolution of new international economic
order positions held by the Third World countries in all international
forums. It is sufficient for the purposes of this article to recognize that
the politics of the Law of the Sea Conference are complex. In respect
to deepsea mining, they have produced the anomalous result of a
treaty that is contrary to the economic interests of most countries but
which persists, because it satisfies the political interests of those
countries, and the negotiations are in the hands of politicians and not
economists.
Even politicians, however, must be subject to judgment. Surely
most recognize that a treaty that discourages the development of the
common heritage of mankind will not only blemish their personal
records but will also set back global efforts to achieve cooperation in a
new era of technological development and world interdependence.
Before this process goes much further, it would seem useful to spell
out as clearly as possible why the treaty presently under negotiation
will have this result.
As ten years of intensive multilateral negotiation on the basic
components of an international deep seabed regime have elapsed, and
the range of final decisions have narrowed, it is not too difficult to
predict the content of any treaty to be concluded within the next two
to three years. The reason is that the deepsea mining negotiations,
for all their extreme swings in the past, are now like a pendulum
whose arc is ever diminishing; indeed, the pendulum has almost
come to rest. Thus, while one can be wrong about final details, it
would be difficult to be wrong about the basic content, assuming that
the time period remaining for negotiation is relatively short. To con-
tinue the analogy, the pendulum would have to be reactivated, if the
objective were to move the final balancing point to another position
on the arc more conducive to deepsea mining investment. And it
would require a fairly lengthy additional time period before the
parameters of the negotiation would once again narrow and predic-
tions about the future investment climate would become reliable.
Since, in virtually every detail of the complex set of draft treaty arti-
cles which have been produced by the Conference so far, the pros-
pective ocean mining company is confronted with obstacles to private
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capital participation in the development of this resource and
generalized hostility to any development at all, it would clearly be in
the interests of most concerned to substantially lengthen the time
period remaining for negotiation of an international deepsea mining
regime.
II. EVALUATING THE PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATE
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF DEEP SEABED
MINERALS UNDER THE DRAFT TREATY
In order to evaluate the investment climate which would be
faced by a private venture seeking to engage in deep ocean mining
under the present draft treaty articles, a number of questions must be
explored. Although interrelated, these questions can, for organiza-
tional purposes, be divided into four categories:
1. The ability to acquire and maintain access to deep seabed min-
eral deposits.
The prospective ocean miner needs first to ascertain what legal
rights he is accorded to conduct ocean mining under the draft
treaty articles, what conditions may legitimately be imposed on his
operations, and under what circumstances may such rights granted
be abridged or revoked.
I Any legal regime for regulating mining activities is likely to
contain some discretionary leeway for the entities entrusted with
administering it. In the case of the draft law of the sea treaty,
however, the incidence of discretion is enormous. Thus, an analysis
of the actual terms of the draft treaty relating to access reveals only
an incomplete picture. To fully respond to the investor's questions
concerning access, certain practical assumptions have to be made
about how the written word is likely to be implemented by the
newly-created political institution, the International Seabed Au-
thority.
2. The ability of the prospective ocean miner to compete in the
marketplace.
To a large extent, these questions involve the economics of his
contemplated project and of metals markets in general, but the
role of governmental bodies in shaping the competitive environ-
ment cannot be ignored. By regulating and controlling entry into
the market, production controls, and by creating a supranational
mining company-the Enterprise-the draft law of the sea treaty
fundamentally alters the international investment climate to which
market economy investors are accustomed.
3. The longevity of the ocean mining investment climate.
Mining companies are almost as concerned with the prospects
for future growth in a new minerals field as they are with the se-
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curity of investment made in a specific project. For ocean mining,
the probability that a particular company will be permitted to un-
dertake a second project, or expand the capacity of the first, is a
critical factor, since the high initial research and development ex-
penditures required to commercialize this novel technology cannot
easily be justified by the economic returns from a single operation
of limited size and duration. Under the draft law of the sea treaty,
the status of private industry ocean mining is only foreseeable for
the first twenty to twenty-five years. At the end of this period, the
entire legal system for regulating ocean mining investment may be
changed by a Review Conference, and the implications for imining
operations undertaken both before and after the Conference must
be understood.
4. The testing of the assumptions made previously about the prob-
able behavior and operation of the International Seabed Au-
thority.
How is this new institution organized and what political in-
terests will control its decisions? How effectively will the provisions
of the treaty itself govern the actions of this multi-purpose regula-
tory and mining body? By assessing the "constitutional" framework
of the International Seabed Authority and the relative strength of
the political forces that will operate within this body, the prospec-
tive ocean miner can complete his evaluation of the overall invest-
ment climate which will prevail under the new international re-
gime.
The principal reference tool for making this assessment of the
future deep seabed investment climate is the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text (hereinafter "ICNT") produced at the Sixth Session
of the Conference in 1977.1 To the extent that provisions of this
draft treaty concerning the deep seabed were the subject of revision
by working groups during the Seventh Session of the Conference at
the Geneva meeting, the revised articles are used as substitutes for
the corresponding provisions of the ICNT, even though the status of
these articles is very much in doubt at this writing.2
1. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doe. AIConf. 62/WP. 10, July 15,
1977 [hereinafter cited as ICNT].
2. The Seventh Session of the Conference convened in the spring of 1978 in
Geneva, Switzerland, created three negotiating groups to consider specific outstand-
ing issues in Part XI of the ICNT, "The Area," and the relevant annexes. Negotiating
Croup 1 produced revised articles concerning the system of deep seabed exploitation.
LOS Conf. Doc. NGI/10/Rev. 1, May 16, 1978. Negotiating Group 2 produced re-
vised articles concerning the financial arrangements of the Authority and of the En-
terprise and the financial terms of contracts. LOS Conf. Doc. NG214; NG2/5, May 4,
1978; NG217, May 12, 1978. Negotiating Group 3 reached no agreement on revisions
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
III. ACQUIRING AND MAINTAINING ACCESS
TO DEEP SEABED RESOURCES
For a number of years, the international negotiations on a deep
seabed regime at the Law of the Sea Conference have been charac-
terized by a fundamental dispute over the entities which should be
permitted to engage in ocean mining. The industrialized countries
with the capability to develop the resources originally insisted that
only states and their nationals should have the right to exploit the
deep seabed, while the developing countries, acting collectively
through their caucus, the Group of 77, insisted that a supranational
public company should engage in ocean mining to the exclusion of
states and private industry. This latter concept of an international
operating monopoly espoused by the Group of 77 became known
euphemistically as "direct exploitation."
The power of the International Seabed Authority (hereinafter
"Authority") to mine the deep seabed on its own has continued to be
a fundamental tenet of the Third World position. The primary reason
is that direct exploitation symbolizes the control over deepsea
resources which developing countries argue was conferred upon them
in principle when the United Nations General Assembly declared the
deep seabed and its resources to be "the common heritage of man-
kind." In Third World thinking, "common heritage" is identical to
"common exploitation." Other motivations of probably less impor-
tance underlying this position include a belief that developing coun-
tries can only participate in ocean mining through an international
agency sympathetic to their aspirations, a conviction that public
enterprises maximize returns to governments and a desire by land-
based producers of the same minerals found in the deep seabed to
use direct exploitation as a mechanism for controlling world minerals
markets. The concept of direct exploitation involves not only the Au-
thority's undertaking mining activities by itself but also its ability to
associate with private industry when it wants and how it wants, in the
same manner as a sovereign state.
to the ICNT concerning the composition and voting procedures of the organs of the
Authority. LOS Conf. Doc. NC3/2, May 12, 1978. Even in those cases where new
articles resulted from face-to-face negotiation between principally concerned states, as
in the case of the U.S.-Canadian negotiation on Article 150 bis, there is very great
doubt that such articles will finally survive in the treaty.
The Seventh Session resumed for a four week meeting in New York, New York,
in August-September 1978. See note 2 supra and accompanying text for description
of the results of this resumed session.
3. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), 8097 U.N. GAOR (1970).
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As a result of the Third World's insistence that the treaty au-
thorize direct exploitation and the industrialized countries' desire to
get on with the job of formulating a new international regime, the
so-called parallel system of exploitation was born. Under this concept,
first publicly accepted by the United States in 1975, the treaty would
accord states and their nationals rights to undertake ocean mining but
at the same time create an Enterprise, the mining arm of the Author-
ity, to engage in direct exploitation in competition with states and
private companies. 4
This two-track system of access is allegedly embodied in the
ICNT, as it would be amended by the revised articles drafted during
the Seventh Session of the Conference. 5 In fact, the notion of equal
or parallel access for states and private industry, on the one hand,
and the Enterprise, on the other, is not implemented in these docu-
ments. The reason is simply that the Third World, because of its
ideological attachment to direct exploitation through the Enterprise,
is not willing to accept a parallel system of exploitation without
significant discrimination in favor of the Enterprise built into the sys-
tem. 6 Accordingly, there has been introduced into the ICNT financial
and other subsidies for the Enterprise, forced technology transfer
from private industry and, in general, the ability to "negotiate" (in
other words, to deny access by not successfully concluding the
negotiations) with applicants on the state and private industry side of
the parallel system in order to ensure that the Enterprise realizes its
mandate of direct exploitation as quickly as possible. Moreover, they
have only been prepared to accept this one-sided parallel system, if at
all, for a temporary period of twenty to twenty-five years. 7
4. See Statement of Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, before the American
Bar Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Dept. of State Press Rel. No. 408,
Aug. 11, 1975.
5. "[T]he [Seventh Session] revealed a more sophisticated understanding of the
economic stakes at issue and a broad acceptance of the aim of making the parallel
system of seabed exploitation workable." See Statement of Elliot L. Richardson, Am-
bassador at Large, Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea
Conference, May 22, 1978.
6. "The Group [of 771 is clearly of the view that it is in the nature of this
[parallel] system that the Enterprise must enjoy a preferential status in the exploita-
tion of the resources in the deep seabed area. See Statement of the Chairman of the
Group of 77, Ambassador S.N. Nandan, before the General Committee, U.N. Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, New York, August 17, 1978.
7. It should be recalled that, when the U.S. Secretary of State in 1976
suggested the idea of a temporary regime to be reviewed in 25 years, he stated then
that the temporary regime must be a pure parallel system-not the one-sided regime
of the ICNT. See Statement of the United States Delegation on Secretary Henry A.
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Analysis of the parallel system of exploitation now contained in
the draft treaty articles demonstrates that the Authority would have
the power to maximize achievment of Third World objectives. In
broad terms, these objectives can be stated as:
(1) The restriction of seabed minerals production so as to insulate
Third World producers of the same minerals from competition;
(2) the concentration of all ocean mining, to the extent that it does
not compete with Third World production, under a single in-
tergovernmental mining agency, the Enterprise, subject to de-
veloping country control; and
(3) the limitation of developed country and private industry ocean
mining activities to that level necessary for the early acquisition
by the Enterprise of the requisite capital and ocean mining
technology, skills and know-how.
To understand why the modified ICNT's version of a parallel sys-
tem of exploitation would not permit private industrial ventures to
engage in ocean mining as a matter of right on "their" side of the
access system, it is first necessary to examine the process by which a
private company would acquire and maintain access under the draft
treaty on a step-by-step basis. For discussion purposes, the provisions
on access are divided into three basic stages: Relevant Authority deci-
sions prior to application for a contract; the procedure for application
and award of contracts; and Authority decisions affecting contract op-
erations. In describing the treaty process, it is assumed at this stage
in the analysis that the Authority will interpret its mandate under the
language of the text so as to acquire the broadest degree of discretion
possible to satisfy those objectives identified as important by the
Third World collectively. This assumption will be tested in the sub-
sequent analysis of the powers and decisionmaking procedures of the
Authority's organs.
A. Authority Decisions Prior to Application
Prior to the time a company applies for a contract to engage in
ocean mining, the Authority is empowered to take a number of ac-
tions that will affect the company's decision whether to move forward
with investment.
1. Adoption of Resource Policy. A variety of production control and
other economic objectives are described in the draft treaty under the
Kissinger's Participation in the Law of the Sea Conference, Press Release USUN-
98(76), Sept. 1, 1976.
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rubric of "resource policy." In the revised articles," the Authority's
resource policies are divided into two categories: general policies re-
lating to ocean mining and production policies. 9 The general policies
include vaguely stated objectives, such as expanding developing coun-
try participation in ocean mining; 10 ensuring transfer of technology
and revenues to the Authority and developing countries; " providing
"adequate" supplies of seabed minerals for consumers; 12 ensuring
"just and stable prices remunerative to producers and fair to consum-
ers"; 13 "preventing monopolization" of ocean mining in the context of
a policy that all states should have the opportunity to engage in ocean
mining; 14 and protecting developing country producers from a de-
cline in the volume or prices of their mineral exports caused by ocean
mining, no matter how slight. 1
5
The production policies established in the draft treaty are for the
purpose of implementing the general policy of protecting Third
World producers.' 6  There are essentially four separate mechanisms:
(1) The Authority is empowered to enter commodity agreements
for seabed minerals, provided that "all interested parties" par-
ticipate, and to control seabed production and prices pursuant
to such agreements, provided that the controls are consistent
with the terms of existing contracts. 17
(2) The draft treaty establishes an artificial production ceiling on
seabed nickel for the first twenty years of ocean mining produc-
tion. 18
8. LOS Conf. Doc. NG1/10/Rev. 1, May 16, 1978 [hereinafter cited as NG1];
NG2/4; NG2/5, May 4, 1978; NG2/7, May 12, 1978 [hereinafter cited as NG2].
9. NG1, Arts. 150, 150 bis.
10. ICNT, Art. 148; NG1, Art. 150(b).
11. NG1, Art. 150(c). In this case, a strong argument exists that the technology
transfer provisions of NGI para. 4(c)(ii) and para. 5(j)(iv) of Annex II, and the finan-
cial arrangements established in para. 7 of Annex II, NG2, provide the exclusive
means by which the Authority can implement this policy. However, the draft treaty
also provides for "joint arrangements" between companies and the Enterprise, which
may open the door to the Authority's adopting additional requirements with respect
to joint ventures for the purpose of implementing this policy. See NG1, Art. 151(3);
ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(i).
12. NG1, Art. 150(d).
13. Id. Art. 150(e).
14. Id. Art. 150(f). This policy accords (he Authority sufficient discretion to adopt
a state quota limiting the number of contracts any one state may sponsor, even if a
quota is not ultimately included in the treaty. See ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(1).
15. NG1, Art. 150(g). In this case, the method of implementing the general pol-
icy is expressly provided in NGI, Art. 150 bis.
16. Id. Arts. 150(g), 150 bis.
17. Id. Art. 150 bis (1).
18. Id. Art. 150 bis (2).
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(3) The Authority is directed to regulate production of seabed min-
erals other than nodules pursuant to regulations, which must be
approved by states in the same manner as amendments to the
convention.' 9
(4) The Authority is directed to establish a system of compensation
for developing country producers adversely affected by ocean
mining.
20
The one-nation, one-vote Assembly is responsible for determin-
ing these policies in general terms,2 1 and the Council is responsible
for determining the specific policies in conformity with the Assem-
bly's decisions. 22 Thus, before a company applies for a seabed min-
ing contract, the Authority may have adopted certain policies which
limit that company's ability to obtain access, for example, the estab-
lishment of a quota on the number of mining operations that may be
undertaken by companies of the same nationality or granting of spe-
cial priorities and preferences for applicants prepared to waive their
immunity from subsequent price and production controls adopted
under a future commodity agreement. 23 Industrialized countries will
have little influence over Assembly decisions, and whatever influence
they have over Council decisions may be irrelevant, since the Council
is subordinate to the Assembly.2 4 Finally, the adoption of such dis-
cretionary policies will not be subject to challenge in the Seabed Dis-
putes Chamber.
25
2. Adoption of Rules and Regulations. The subjects of the Author-
ity's regulations are theoretically limited.26 However, the limited list
of permissible subjects includes such open-ended headings as "ad-
ministrative procedures," which could be argued to cover any stan-
dard the Authority wishes to use for awarding or denying contracts; 
27
technology transfer and the "direct participation" of developing coun-
tries, which accords discretion to adopt any regulatory requirements
for the benefit of developing countries; 2 8 and implementation of the
19. Id. Art. 150 bis (3).
20. Id. Art. 150 bis (4).
21. ICNT, Art. 158(1).
22. Id. Art. 160(1).
23. See NG1, Art. 150 bis (1) (last sentence); see also supra note 14.
24. See general discussion of the Assembly and Council infra.
25. See ICNT Art. 191 and discussion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber in text
accompanying note 235 infra.
26. See ICNT, Annex II, para. 11(a) and discussion of the procedure for adopting
the Authority's rules and regulations, in text accompanying note 186 infra.
27. Id. para. 11(a)(1).
28. Id. para. 11(a)(2)(xii).
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Council's decisions on resource policies. 2 9  In brief, the draft treaty
arguably permits these regulations to impose any obligation on con-
tractors which the Authority believes is necessary to implement vague
policies, such as increased developing country participation in ocean
mining (for example, a requirement that all processing plants be lo-
cated in developing countries)3" and restrictions on the number of
contracts which may be awarded to the nationals of any one state. 3 1
Since the Assembly ultimately has the power to adopt the Authority's
regulations, there is a real risk that requirements on contractors will
be excessive. 3 2  Moreover, the legality of these regulations would not
be subject to judicial review in- the unlikely event that a regulatory
requirement could not be justified on the basis of these generally
stated policies.3 3
3. Regulation of Prospecting. The draft treaty establishes certain ob-
ligations for companies conducting deep seabed minerals prospecting,
which may rise to the level of Authority regulation of such ac-
tivities.3 4  Before conducting prospecting, a company must:
(a) notify the Authority of the broad area of the seabed in which
prospecting will be undertaken;
(b) undertake to comply with the Authority regulations concerning
environmental protection, data transfer, and training of Author-
ity personnel; and
(c) agree to permit the Authority to "verify" its compliance with
these and any other regulations that may relate to prospect-
ing.a5
While certain obligations imposed on contractors conducting ex-
ploration and exploitation, such as revenue and technology transfer,
29. Id. para. 11(a)(4).
30. Id. para. 11(a)(4); ICNT, Art. 148; NG1, Art. 150(b).
31. ICNT, Annex II, para. 11(a)(4); NG1, Art. 150(f).
32. See general discussion of the Assembly infra.
33. See ICNT, Art. 191 and discussion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, in text
accompanying note 235 infra.
34. ICNT, Annex II, para. 2(a). "Prospecting" is arguably not an "activity in the
Area" as defined in Article 133(a) of the ICNT; thus, it should not be governed by
any provision of the draft treaty other than para. 2 of Annex II, ICNT. Nevertheless,
para. L1(a)(1) of Annex II, ICNT, authorizes the adoption of regulations concerning
"administrative procedures relating to prospecting," and para. 11(a)(2) contains a long
list of possible subjects for operational regulations, which are expressly limited to
operations tinder contracts in only a few instances- See also note 97 infra and accom-
panying text.
35. ICNT, Annex II, para. 2(a).
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are clearly inapplicable to prospectors, the draft treaty is silent on the
nature of any other obligations that might be imposed on a company
seeking to prospect. Of key importance is the failure to specify the
extent of data turnover requirements that may be imposed on pros-
pectors, to extend protections for proprietary data to propectors,
38
and to establish the nature of any penalties that may be imposed on
prospectors for noncompliance with regulations.
B. Application and Award of Contracts
The procedure by which a company applies for and is awarded
access to deep seabed minerals in the form of a contract contains
many ambiguities and, thus, accords the Authority considerable dis-
cretion. The application process can be broken down into four steps:
(a) Determination that the applicant is qualified;
(b) selection of those qualified applicants who will be considered;
(c) negotiation of the contract; and
(d) approval and disapproval of contracts.
1. Qualification Procedure. The first step in the contracting process
is a determination by the Authority (presumably the Technical Com-
mission) that the applicant is in compliance with the Authority's ap-
plication procedures and has the requisite qualifications. 37 Both the
administrative procedures and the qualifications will be set forth in
the regulations described above. 3s The draft treaty expressly re-
quires the applicant to:
(a) Satisfy the Authority's regulations with respect to financial
standing, technological capability, and satisfactory performance
under any previous contracts; 3
(b) include in his application any information the Authority re-
quests concerning his mining technology;" 0
(c) submit to the Authority either two mine-sites or a single mine-
site twice as large as required by the applicant, from which the
Authority will reserve one site for itself; -, and
36. See id., para. 8.
37. Id. para. 5(b). Article 163(2)(xiv) of the ICNT provides that the Technical
Commission reviews formal written plans of work, including contract applications.
See further discussion of the Technical Commission infro.
38. ICNT, Annex II, para. 4(a).
39. Id.
40. NG1, Annex II, para. 4(c)(ii).
41. ICNT, Annex II, para 5(j)(i). Although the obligation to submit two mine-sites
is phrased in terms of the contractor, it is self-evident that at least the coordinates
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(d) provide the Authority with "satisfactory assurances" that he will
comply with all of the obligations imposed on contractors under
the draft treaty, including mandatory technology transfer. 42
These requirements are so vague that they accord the Authority
enormous discretion to decide whether the applicant is "qualified."
Additional criteria could be utilized, since the draft treaty's listing of
the requirements is not exhaustive.
43
If the applicant is rejected at this stage, it is very unlikely that
he would have recourse to judicial review, since the Authority's deci-
sion would no doubt be considered as discretionary.4 4 A rejected
applicant may have turned over to the Authority proprietary informa-
tion about his technology, as well as commercially valuable informa-
tion concerning the location of two attractive nodule deposits. The
protections for proprietary data in the draft convention only extend to
contractors, not to applicants. 45  Moreover, a fair reading of the text
is that there are no prohibitions on the Authority's disclosing pro-
prietary information to the Enterprise, which is part of the Author-
ity. 46  By submitting an application then, the company may transfer
to another ocean mining competitor-the Enterprise-a significant
portion of the value of its preapplication commercial work effort.
2. Selection Procedure. The second step in the contracting process
is the selection from among conflicting applications, if any, of those
companies with whom the Authority will negotiate the terms of
access. The draft treaty includes several devices which convert
conflicting applications from the anomaly they would be in a non-
discretionary, first-come, first-served system to an undoubtedly fre-
quent occurrence:
First, the Authority considers applications for contracts only
three times per year. 47 There is no requirement that applications be
sealed until considered and no prohibition on the Authority's advertis-
ing proposed areas, either publicly or selectively. The result is Au-
identifying the location of the proposed area or areas must be included in the formal
written plan of work, or application. See note 131 infra and accompanying text.
42. ICNT, Annex II, para. 4(c); NGI, Annex II, para. 4(c)(iii), bis, ter, quater,
quinte.
43. See ICNT, Annex 1I, para. 4(a).
44. See ICNT, Art. 191 and discussion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber in text
accompanying note 235 infra.
45. ICNT, Annex II, para. 8.
46. See id.; ICNT, Art. 156(2).
47. ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(a).
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thority discretion to circumvent a first-come, first-served system and
to encourage conflicting applications for the same areas. Since the
Enterprise may operate in non-reserved areas, 48 it is conceivable that
the Enterprise would be informed of private company applications, so
that the Enterprise could submit a conflicting application. 4 9 The
reason for such a practice would be that the Authority's bargaining
leverage in the case of conflicting claims is substantially enhanced
under the draft treaty. 50
Second, the production ceiling in the draft treaty is allocated on
an annual basis. 51  During the first five years of the twenty-five year
interim period, the ceiling is calculated on the basis of the full growth
segment in world nickel consumption.1
2
After that time, the ceiling is reduced to sixty percent of the
nickel consumption growth. 53 In rough calculations, the ceiling
would permit the issuance of as few as one contract per year from,
say, 1987 to 2000.54 Thus, there is a substantial likelihood that there
will be more than one application for the increase in seabed produc-
tion which is allowed under the ceiling in any given year.
Third, the amount of new seabed production that may be un-
dertaken by private companies under the ceiling in any given time
period is further restricted by the high probability that a substantial
portion of the ceiling will be allocated to the Enterprise. While the
Enterprise may only reserve part of the ceiling pursuant to a plan of
work approved by the Council, 55 the procedures for Council approval
48. Id. para. 5(j)(v).
49. There is some ambiguity about whether an Enterprise application is subject
to the same procedures as apply to private companies. Compare ICNT, Annex II,
para. 6 (the Enterprise is only subject to the Authority's regulations) with NG1, Art.
151(3) (Enterprise plans of work shall be drawn up in accordance with Annex II). See
also discussion of the Enterprise infra.
50. See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text.
51. NGI, Art. 150 bis (2)(b). It should be noted that the allocation of the ceiling
is based on the year of commencement of commercial production, not the year the
contract is approved.
52. Id. Art. 150 his (2)(a), (b).
53. Id.
54. The actual number of contracts that may be issued under the production ceil-
ing contained in Article 150 bis of NG1 will depend on the Authority's calculations of
the actual rate of growth in world nickel consumption pursuant to the formula con-
tained in the draft article. Moreover, projections are difficult because the allocation of
the permissible production ceiling is based on the year in which the applicant intends
to bring his planned project into commercial production, and the time-period be-
tween application and the commencement of commercial production may vary among
projects.
55. NG1, Art. 150 bis (2).
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of Enterprise plans of work make it very unlikely that industrialized
countries would be able to ensure rejection of Enterprise projects
that are of a speculative or unsound nature, and thus will not reach
commercial production. 5 6 To the extent that a safeguard against En-
terprise speculation with the production ceiling might be found in the
requirement that the Enterprise comply with the Authority's opera-
tional regulations (including diligence requirements), it is made inef-
fective by the Authority's discretion to negotiate the applicability of
these regulations to particular operations.5 7
Given these powers to encourage conflicting applications-either
for the same area or for the same portion of the production ceiling-
the procedure for selecting among applicants is critical. In the case of
conflicting applications, the draft treaty permits the Authority to
negotiate with the applicants in order to decide which of them is
comparatively best qualified or has the best application.58 Among
the criteria which are expressly permitted to be examined are:
-Which applicant offers the most attractive opportunity for develop-
ing country participation in this project? 5
-which applicant's technology is most attractive as the subject of
forced transfer to the Enterprise and possibly developing countries?"6
and
-which applicant is prepared to enter a joint venture with the En-
terprise or, if there is more than one joint venture offer, which is
most attractive to the Enterprise? 6'
Having made the selection among conflicting applicants, the Author-
ity then enters a negotiation with one of them on the terms of a
contract. 62 Unquestionably, an applicant rejected at this stage has no
recourse to judicial review, since the Authority's selection is entirely
discretionary. 63
3. Negotiation of Contract Terms. The third step in the contracting
process is the negotiation of contract terms, 64 a negotiation which ex-
pressly covers:
56. See notes 74-76 infra and accompanying text.
57. ICNT, Annex II, para. 6 (Enterprise must comply with operational regula-
tions). Cf. id. para. 5(d)(i) (negotiation of the contract deals with application of regula-
tions).
58. Id. para. 5(g).
59. Id. para. 5(d)(ii).
60. NCI, Annex II, para. 4(c)(ii); ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(d)(iii).
61. ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(g).
62. Id. para. 5(g).
63. See ICNT, art. 191 and discussion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber in text
accompanying note 235 infra.
64. ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(c).
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-operational requirements under the regulations;
-financial obligations;
-participation of developing countries;
-technology transfer; and
-ensuring that the contract is in "full conformity" with the con-
vention and the Authority's regulations. 65
Based on other provisions of the draft treaty, the negotiations
may also cover:
-the possibility of a joint venture with the Enterprise; 66
-the settlement of contract disputes; whether they will be submit-
ted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber, binding arbitration or some
other form of arbitration;6 7 and
-the waiver of basic rights accorded contractors under the con-
vention, such as immunity against subsequent price and production
controls decided under a commodity agreement. 68
The Authority has tremendous power in these negotiations to in-
sist on terms and conditions unfavorable to the contractor, as long as
its demands can be justified under the broad language of the Author-
ity's "resource policies" and implementary regulations. 69 In fact, by
using its discretionary power to give "financial incentives" to
operators who offer developing country or Enterprise participation in
a project, the Authority need never adopt directly coercive positions
in the contract negotiation in order to satisfy its objectives. 70
There are no effective safeguards against the Authority's using its
power to "negotiate" as a means of arbitrarily denying access. The
contract application will probably not be submitted to the Council by
the Technical Commission until the "issues under negotiation are set-
tled." 71 And industrialized countries are unlikely to have sufficient
voting power in the Council to obtain an affirmative decision ordering
the Technical Commission to release the application under negotia-
tion. 72  Here, again, the applicant is unlikely to have recourse to
65. Id. para. 5(d), (e).
66. Id. para. 5(i).
67. See ICNT, Art. 188.
68. See ICNT, Annex IU, para. 5(e); NG1, Art. 150 his (1) (last sentence).
69. See notes 8-33 supra and accompanying text.
70. See NG2, Annex II, para. 7 septies.
71. See ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(f); NG1, Art. 151(3).
72. See general discussion of the Council infra.
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judicial review for the purpose of either forcing a conclusion to the
"negotiation" or challenging the Authority's position on the contract
terms.
73
4. Award of Contracts. The only standard limiting the Authority's
discretion to refuse to conclude a contract in the draft treaty is the
requirement that it approve a contract "[a]s soon as the issues under
negotiation ...have been settled." 74 The Technical Commission is
not actually empowered to disapprove a contract application but may
only recommend appropriate action to the Council. 75  However, as
mentioned above, there is no requirement that the Technical Com-
mission submit all applications to the Council for decision.
If the Technical Commission submits a contract proposal to the
Council, there is some chance that opponents of the contract will be
unable to block its approval. The reason is that the contract will be
deemed to have been approved by the Council, unless a three-fourths
majority votes to disapprove the contract within sixty days. 76  Shift-
ing the burden in this manner may give industrialized country mem-
bers, if they invariably vote together, the power to ensure that all
contract proposals submitted are approved. However, the indus-
trialized countries on the Council may may not always vote together
on this issue, since they are ultimately competitors.
C. Decisions Affecting Contract Operations
Once a company concludes a contract with the Authority, a
number of provisions of the draft treaty render very uncertain the
security of any investment made under that contract. For example,
the exclusive rights to a specific deposit accorded the contractor-
which are indispensable to security of tenure-are shared "with the
Authority" under the draft treaty. 77 This provision suggests the na-
73. See ICNT, Art. 191 and discussion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber in text
accompanying note 235 infre.
74. ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(f).
75. ICNT, Art. 160(2)(x), 163(2)(xiv).
76. Id. Art. 159(7), 160(2)(x). Under more stringent proposals for Council voting,
advocated by the United States, requiring concurrent majorities in several chambers,
this tacit approval procedure for contracts would be likely to assure contract approval.
See general discussion of the Council infra. However, it is important to note that the
procedure is equally applicable to the approval of Enterprise contracts, and thus
substantially diminishes the ability of industrialized countries to block unfair and dis-
criminatory advantages for the Enterprise. Further, the blocking power is only useful
once the Technical Commission submits the contract. Under any Council proposal on
the table, industrialized countries would not have the power to obtain an affirmative
vote directing the actions of the commissions.
77. ICNT, Annex II, para. 10.
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ture of the Authority's control over contract operations, but other
aspects of the draft treaty pose an even more substantial threat to
security of investment:
First, while the draft treaty expressly provides for security of
tenure for operators, 78 there are no limitations on what rights the
Authority may require the contractor to waive as the price of obtain-
ing a contract. 79  Hence, every contract may empower the Authority
to impose price and production controls, 80 require the contractor to
comply with regulations issued subsequent to the contract,81 require
the contractor to waive access to the Seabed Disputes Chamber in
favor of Authority-governed arbitration,8 2 or otherwise impose obliga-
tions to comply with subsequent policy decisions of the Council and
the Assembly.8 3
Second, the rules and regulations incorporated into the contract
may be "provisional" in that they have been adopted by the Council
but not the Assembly. 84 Hence, Assembly action can lead to funda-
mental changes in the terms of a contract upon which investment has
been based.
Third, although contract disputes are theoretically reviewable,
the policy, or discretionary decisions of the Assembly and Council are
not s85 neither is the substance of rules and regulations.8 6  Thus, As-
sembly policies and new regulations that adversely affect contract op-
erations cannot be challenged in the Seabed Disputes Chamber or in
an arbitral commission. 8 7  Given the supremacy of the Assembly,
8 8
and Third World control over it, 8 9 the result is continual uncertainty
for the contractor over whether his investment will be impaired by
78. NG1, Art. 151(6); ICNT, Annex II, paras. 12 and 13. In the event the con-
tract is with the Enterprise, it is unclear whether the contractor has security of ten-
ure or any recourse to dispute settlement. ICNT, Art. 187(2). Joint arrangements
entered pursuant to Article 151(3) of the NG1 revised articles may have security of
tenure protection under Article 151(6); but nowhere is it clear that the Authority
cannot force private operators into other forms of joint ventures.
79. See ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(d), (e).
80. See NG1, Art. 150 bis (1).
81. See ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(d) (i).
82. See ICNT, Art. 188.
83. See id. Annex II, para. 5(d), (e).
84. ICNT, Art. 158(2) (xvi), 160(2)(xiv).
85. ICNT, Art. 191.
86. Id.
87. Id. Art. 188.
88. Id. Art. 158(1).
89. See general discussion of the Assembly infra.
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the actions taken by the annual Assembly session. Moreover, the
likelihood of radical change is heightened at five-year intervals, by
the requirement that the Assembly undertake a review of the system
to "improve the regime." 9 0
Finally, contracts would defer many critical details to later
negotiation with the Authority, and the discretionary nature of such
negotiations means that, in general, the contractor would have no
choice but to comply or risk revocation of his contract. For example,
it is possible for the Authority to defer its decision on which of the
two mine-sites submitted it will reserve, forcing the contractor to
explore both sites.9 1 The system for determining the level of royalty
and profit-sharing payments owed by the contractor is highly dis-
cretionary, and the Authority could require higher payments than
would be fair on the basis of the contract terms.9 2 Furthermore, the
terms and conditions under which the contractor would be required
to license his technology to the Enterprise will be negotiated after
the contract is concluded, 93 although, in this instance alone provision
is made for binding arbitration of disputes.
9 4
D. Conclusions
The preceding discussion leads to the inescapable conclusion that
a prospective ocean mining company could not reasonably predict
whether it would be able to obtain a contract to engage in ocean
mining under the present draft treaty; nor can such a company be
assured that the terms and conditions included in any contract
awarded would allow profitable operations or effectively insulate the
investment from the imposition of new requirements that impair its
value.
Nevertheless, in the event that an applicant obtained a contract
and could be assured of its fair and reasonable administration by the
Authority, the applicant would need to evaluate carefully the impact
of direct exploitation by the Enterprise on its competitive position
under the draft treaty, before investing over a billion dollars.
90. ICNT, Art. 152.
91. See ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(j)(i).
92. See NG2, Annex II, para. 7.
93. NGI, Annex II, para. 4(c)(ii) ter.
94. Id. para. 5(j)(iv). Note that there is no description in the draft treaty of the
arbitration procedure to be used or the law to be applied.
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE ENTERPRISE
IN THE PARALLEL SYSTEM OF EXPLOITATION
Of all the major issues arising in the deep seabed negotiations,
the problems attendant on operations by the Enterprise have re-
ceived the least thoughtful consideration. As a result of the Confer-
ence's failure to come to grips with the establishment of a suprana-
tional public mining company, the details of the organization, powers,
and functioning of the Enterprise are deferred to the future, with the
draft treaty containing only the most general authorizations and guid-
ance.
This absence of detail does not mean, however, that the role of
the Enterprise in the parallel system of access purportedly estab-
lished under the draft treaty can be discounted. A practical assess-
ment of the probable operation of the new international regime dem-
onstrates that the Enterprise will assume primacy in ocean mining in
the earliest years of development. This can occur in two ways: (1)
Either access to deep seabed resources will only be accorded to states
or private companies if they enter into some relationship with the
Enterprise, or (2) Enterprise operations will be so heavily subsidized
and favored by the Authority that ocean miners not entering associa-
tions with it will be at a great competitive disadvantage. The fact that
the Enterprise will be created and initiate its activities in a virtual
vacuum, subject to the discretion of a Governing Board elected by
the Assembly, the policies of the Assembly, and an unspecified
supervisory role for the Council, only heightens the concern about its
monopolist potential.
In order to examine how the establishment of the Enterprise af-
fects the investment climate for mining under the draft treaty, it is
useful to consider several broad issues: How is the Enterprise or-
ganized and who controls its activities? What comparative advantages
do Enterprise operations have over other ocean miners? What costs
and benefits are experienced by private industrial entities which do
business with the Enterprise?
A. Organization and Control of the Enterprise
The Enterprise would be an organ of the Authority,95 established
within the framework of the international legal personality of the Au-
thority. 96 The exclusive purpose of the Enterprise would be to carry
95. ICNT, Art. 156(2).
96. Id. Art. 169(2).
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out "activities in the Area," deep seabed mineral exploration and
exploitation, directly for the Authority. 97
Under the draft treaty, the Enterprise is comprised of a Govern-
ing Board, a Director-General and appropriate staff.98 The Govern-
ing Board, responsible for the conduct of Enterprise operations, 9
would be composed of fifteen members elected by the Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Council on the basis of equitable
geographical representation, taking into account "special in-
terests."100 It is unclear whether Board members are intended to
serve in an individual, personal capacity or in an official capacity as
representatives of states.' 0 1 Even assuming that such members serve
as individuals, the Governing Board will be dominated by nationals of
developing countries, who will clearly account for the simple majority
required to adopt Board decisions. 10 2
The Director-General would also be elected by the Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Council. 10 3 As chief of the operat-
ing staff of the Enterprise, the Director-General would be responsible
for conducting the ordinary business of the Enterprise, subject to the
direction of the Governing Board. 104 The draft treaty provides that
the critical factors in appointing the staff of the Enterprise shall be
efficiency, technical competence, wide geographical representation,
and keeping the size of the staff to a minimum. 10 5
Thus, the structure of the Enterprise is conventionally hierar-
chical: the Governing Board controls the Director-General, who in
turn controls Enterprise personnel. Since the Governing Board would
be composed on an equitable geographical basis, taking into account
97. See id. Art. 169(1); Annex III, para. 1(a). The definition of "activities in the
Area" is presently restricted to exploration and exploitation. Id. Art. 133 (a). Under a
restrictive interpretation, then, the Enterprise would not be empowered to condut
prospecting or to engage in processing and marketing activities. But see id. Annex
III, para. 11(e) ("the Enterprise shall exercise all such powers incidental to its busi-
ness as shall be necessary or desirable in furtherance of its purposes"); para. 11(d)
(Enterprise has title to "processed substances produced by it" and its products "shall
be marketed").
98. Id. Annex III, para. 4.
99. Id. para. 5(a).
100. ICNT, Art. 158(2)(iv); Annex 1II, para. 5(b).
101. Paragraph 5(b) of Annex III, ICNT, provides that the Governing Board shall
comprise "qualified, competent and experienced members," suggesting that such
members may serve in an individual capacity.
102. ICNT, Annex III, para. 5(d).
103. Id. para. 6(a).
104. Id. para. 6(b).
105. Id. para. 6(d).
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special interests, those industrialized countries with an economic in-
terest in ocean mining are unlikely to exert much influence over the
internal decisions of the Enterprise. To the extent that such influence
represents an important safeguard against unfair and discriminatory
practices by the Enterprise, it will have to be exercised through other
organs of the Authority, principally the Council.
By the terms of the draft treaty, the Enterprise is subordinate to
both the Assembly and the Council.' 0 6 Although it is subject to the
directives and control of the Council, it is given implied indepen-
dence to act in accordance with the Assembly's general policies.
10 7
Also, the Enterprise apparently has greater powers to implement the
"resource policies" established in the treaty than those of the Council
itself. '0 8 The net effect of these provisions is to render uncertain the
extent of the Council's control over the Enterprise and correspond-
ingly, the influence of industrialized countries over its operations.
It is clear that the Council exercises certain important powers
over the Enterprise:
-First, it is empowered to approve or disapprove the Enterprise's
proposals for mining, or plans of work. 109 Under the "automatic"
Council procedure for the approval of plans of work, however, the
ability of industrialized country Council members to block Enter-
prise projects which they find objectionable is probably non-
existant. 110
-Second, the Council would issue directives to the Enterprise
and supervise its operations."' Industrialized countries on the
Council may possess sufficient voting strength to collectively veto
unsatisfactory directives to the Enterprise, but council members
from developing countries will inevitably have the same power to
block supervisory decisions which industrialized countries seek. 
1
'
-Third, the Council would approve the sources and levels of debt
financing for the Enterprise,"13 and would make the initial decision
106. See ICNT, Art. 169(1); Annex III, para. 2(a).
107. Id.
108. Compare ICNT, Annex III, para. 1(b) (Enterprise shall act in accordance with
the resource policy set forth in Article 150) with ICNT, Art. 160(2)(xii) (Council shall
adopt on advice of the Economic Planning Commission measures in accordance with
Article 150(1)(g) only).
109. ICNT, Art. 160(2)(x).
110. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
111. ICNT, Art. 160(2)(i), (ix).
112. See general discussion of the Council infra.
113. NG2, Annex III, para. 10 bis (a).
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as to the amount of Authority revenues that would be turned over
to the Enterprise to fund its operations." 4 However, the Assem-
bly makes the final determination as to the degree to which the
Enterprise is subsidized from the Authority's own funds.
1 15
just as industrialized country influence on the Council is unlikely
to ensure effective supervision over the implementation of the access
system for private contractors by the Technical Commission, the En-
terprise would also have substantial independence. The predominant
role of developing countries on the Governing Board of the Enter-
prise suggests that it may emerge as a political organ, despite the
vague mandate contained in the draft treaty to eschew political con-
siderations."n Moreover, unlike the Council or the Technical Com-
mission, the Enterprise would not be subject to suit by states or their
nationals in the Seabed Disputes Chamber for violation of the con-
vention, misuse of power, or similar grounds."
7
B. Comparative Economic Advantages for Enterprise Operations
As originally conceived by the the industrialized countries, the
basic concept of the parallel system of exploitation was that the En-
terprise would undertake ocean mining in direct competition with
states and private companies, but would be subject to the same reg-
ulatory requirements as those imposed by the draft treaty on other
operators. From the start, the Third World resisted this concept of
absolute parity because it believed the Enterprise could never ac-
quire the financial, technical, and managerial resources necessary to
compete effectively with large multinational corporations. Its response
to a proposal that was viewed as an essentially hollow industrialized
country concession was to insist that the Authority be empowered to
withhold access to the resources from private industrial ventures un-
less and until those ventures were prepared to assist the Enterprise
in getting started in the ocean mining business. In an attempt to
intercept what the industrialized countries perceived to be an end-
run around their expressed objective of guaranteed or assured access,
they began to make a series of additional concessions involving direct
114. Id. Art. 160(2)(xv bis).
115. Id. Art. 158(2)(vii).
116. ICNT, Annex III, para. 11(f) (only economic considerations should be rele-
vant to Enterprise decisions).
117. Id. Art. 187(2)(a), (b) (Seabed Disputes Chamber jurisdiction over suits
against the Assembly, Council, or its organs). Parties to contracts with the Enterprise
concerning activities in the Area may be able to sue the Enterprise in the Chamber.
See ICNT, Art. 187(2)(c).
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subsidization of Enterprise operations. The aim of these proposals was
to persuade developing countries that the Enterprise could become a
viable operating entity reasonably soon after commercial ocean min-
ing began.
The present draft treaty combines all of the direct Enterprise
subsidies proposed by the industrialized countries (and some which
they did not propose) with a highly discretionary access system that
permits the Authority to give the Enterprise virtually all of the indi-
rect subsidies advocated by the Third World. Most of these subsidies
are to be extracted from the private companies and state enterprises
which seek access to deep seabed minerals, thus increasing their costs
of entry into this new field. All of these subsidies would place other
operators at a serious economic disadvantage in comparison to the
Enterprise. 118
1. Direct Enterprise Subsidies. The draft treaty articles contain
numerous provisions which expressly grant economic benefits not en-
joyed by states or their nationals to the Enterprise. The primary ben-
efits are:
First, the Enterprise would not be required to make financial
payments to the Authority in the same manner as other operators. 119
Contractors would have to assume a variety of Authority tax obliga-
tions under the draft treaty articles, including the payment of initial
administrative fees, annual fixed fees, production charges, and possi-
bly a share of net profits. 120  Theoretically, the level of these finan-
cial burdens would be uniform as to all operators, other than the
Enterprise, and set forth precisely in the final treaty. 1 21 The Enter-
118. The exclusive safeguard against unfair price competition by the Enterprise,
made possible by the pervasive subsidization of its operations, is a requirement that
the Enterprise market its production "at not less than international market prices."
ICNT, Annex III, para. 11(d)(ii). This provision is wholly inadequate as a prohibition
on the Enterprise's engaging in unfair pricing practices beyond the very earliest years
of deep seabed minerals development. The reason is that seabed production of min-
erals can over time assume such importance in world metals markets as to directly
influence international market prices. For example, cobalt production from only a few
ocean mine-sites will represent a substantial portion of world cobalt supply; and if the
Enterprise can sell its cobalt at lower prices than non-subsidized private company
contractors, it can virtually dictate the international price. The same may eventually
be true for world nickel, and possibly manganese prices.
119. See NG2, Annex II, para. 7 (applies exclusively to financial terms of con-
tracts).
120. Id.
121. See id. para. 7(c) (regulations concerning financial obligations should ensure
equal treatment of all states and entities obtaining contracts).
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prise, on the other hand, would only be required to return an un-
specified portion of its profits to the revenue fund of the Authority,
such portion to be determined by the Assembly on the recommenda-
tion of the Governing Board. 1 22  Since the Council is not involved,
industrialized countries with an interest in assuring that the Enter-
prise operates on a competitive basis would have no role to play in
this determination. Moreover, the draft treaty expressly provides that
the Enterprise would not be required to return any of its profits to
the Authority until it becomes "self-sufficient." 123
Second, the Enterprise would initially obtain concessionary
financing as a result of an obligation assumed by States Parties to
guarantee the debts it incurs in financing its early administration and
carrying out its first mining project. 1 24
Third, after its first project, the Enterprise would be subsidized
from the revenues acquired by the Authority from contractors. 125
Just as the amount of international taxes that the Enterprise would
pay to the Authority is a matter in the discretion of the Assembly, the
extent to which it would repay "dividends" to the Authority on profits
earned from this form of "equity" is similarly left for subsequent As-
sembly decision. 126
Fourth, the Enterprise would be immune from all forms of na-
tional taxation. 1 2 7  The draft treaty, however, does not prohibit
national taxation of ocean mining revenues earned by private contrac-
tors, and there is even a dispute raging in the United States as to
whether taxes paid by such entities to the Authority would be treated
as a credit or a deduction for United States income tax purposes.'
28
The Enterprise would also enjoy additional privileges and im-
munities, such as immunity from state expropriation. 1 2 9
Fifth, for every contract awarded by the Authority to a state or
private company, the Enterprise would obtain priority rights over a
122. Id. Art. 158(2)(vii); Annex III, para. 9(a).
123. Id. Annex III, para. 9 (b).
124. Id. para. 10 bis (c).
125. Id. Art. 158(2)(vii), 160(2)(xv bis), 172(2)(b); Annex II1, para. 10(a).
126. See note 122 supra.
127. ICNT, Annex III, para. 12(e).
128. See Mining of the Deep Seabed: Joint Hearings on S. 2053 Before the Sub-
comm. on Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources and the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1977) (Statement of Helen B. Junz, Deputy Asst. Sec., Dept. of
the Treasury).
129. See ICNT, Annex III, para. 12.
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fully prospected, and possibly explored, mine-site submitted by the
contractor and reserved by the Authority. 130 Ambiguous language in
the relevant draft article suggests that, in addition to acquiring
knowledge of the coordinates of this reserved deposit, the Enterprise
would also obtain geological and other commercially valuable informa-
tion concerning the mine-site submitted by the contractor.
131 It
should be noted that the Enterprise is not restricted to operations
within mine-sites reserved under this provision, but may apply for
Council approval to conduct ocean mining anywhere in the deep sea-
bed. 132
Sixth, the Enterprise is the beneficiary of mandatory technology
transfer obligations imposed on state and private company contrac-
tors.13 3  As the price of acquiring access, each contractor must agree
to license or otherwise transfer his ocean mining technology to the
Enterprise, if later requested to do so. 13 4 Since the transfer would,
in effect, be a forced sale, the Enterprise acquires tremendous bar-
gaining power over the terms and conditions of the sale, despite the
vague treaty standard that such terms should be fair, reasonable, and
commercial.' 3 5 Not only is the Enterprise empowered as a result of
mandatory technology transfer to purchase such technology at dis-
counted value, but it also acquires access to the commercial secrets of
its competitors from the time that applications for a contract are
made. '3 6
2. Indirect Enterprise Subsidies. A careful review of the entire
set of treaty articles comprising the deep seabed portion of the draft
law of tle sea treaty produces the unmistakable impression that the
Enterprise is intended to occupy a priority position among the en-
130. Id. Annex II, para. 5(j).
131. See id. para. 5(j)(i) (last sentence). See also notes 149-150 infra and accom-
panying text.
132. ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(j)(v).
133. NG1, Annex II, para. 4(c)(ii), bis, ter, quater, quinte; para. 5(j)(iv). Note that
the technology subject to mandatory transfer is that to be used in carrying out ac-
tivities in the Area. Id. para. 4(c)(ii) ter. Developing countries seeking to undertake
ocean mining in reserved areas over which the Enterprise has not exercised its prior-
ity would be entitled to the same technology transfer benefits as the Enterprise. id.
para. 4(c)(ii) quinte.
134. Id. para. 4(c)(ii) ter. Note that the contractor must also undertake not to use
technology that he is not legally entitled to transfer, unless the owner of such
technology agrees to license or sell it to the Enterprise. Id. para 4(c)(ii) bis.
135. Id. para 4(c)(ii) ter.
136. See id. para. 4(c)(ii) (applicant must give Authority description of his technol-
ogy and update this information throughout the term of the contract). See also notes
149-50 infra and accompanying text.
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tities authorized to conduct ocean mining. While the relevant provi-
sions are frequently ambiguous, and in some cases inconsistent, it is
clear that a principal objective of the Authority is to ensure that the
Enterprise commences operations as soon as possible after entry into
force of the convention,1 3 7 and that it maintains a dominant-if not
monopolistic-position throughout the initial twenty year period con-
templated for the parallel system of exploitation.' 38
The mechanisms through which the Authority can indirectly sub-
sidize the Enterprise in order to satisfy this objective are pervasive:
First, the technical provisions in the draft treaty governing the
procedure by which other operators obtain access to the resources
and the terms and conditions of their contracts are not applicable to
the Enterprise. Thus, the Enterprise need not satisfy the financial
and technical qualifications required of contractors, 139 nor does its
plan of work need to be "in strict conformity" with the convention
and the Authority's rules and regulations.14 0 In addition, the Enter-
prise is not necessarily required to compete with other applicants on
the basis of its competence and qualifications in the event that it
submits a conflicting application for the same seabed deposit or pot-
tion of the seabed production ceiling.' 4 ' In short, the draft treaty is
rife with provisions that indirectly mandate Authority discrimination
on behalf of the Enterprise in the access system.
142
Second, to the extent that the Enterprise is generally required
by the draft treaty to conduct operations in accordance with the con-
vention and rules and regulations,' 43 the excessive discretionary pow-
ers granted the Authority to implement the regime, 144 coupled with
137. See, e.g., ICNT, Art. 169(4); NG2, Annex II, para. 7(c); Annex III, para. 9(b).
138. See NG1, Art. 153(6). See also discussion of the Review Conference in text
accompanying note 154 infra.
139. See ICNT, Annex II, para. 4(a), 5(b)(ii).
140. See id. para. 3(c)(i).
141. See id. para. 5(g).
142. A key example of this discrimination is found in the basic treaty article estab-
lishing the system of exploitation in principle. NG1, Art. 151. This article provides
that activities in the Area shall be carried out by the Enterprise (without further
qualification), but may only be carried out by states and their nationals "which meet
the requirements provided in this part of the present Convention including Annex
II." Id. Art. 151(2).
143. See, e.g., NG1, Art. 151(4); ICNT, Art. 169(2); Annex 11, para. 6; Annex III,
para. 1(b).
144. See discussion of acquiring and maintaining access in text accompanying note
2 supra.
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the absence of judicial review over the exercise of this discretion, 1 45
enhances the potential for discrimination in favor of the Enterprise.
Third, although the Authority's "resource policies" apply with
equal force to the Enterprise's activities, 146 the practical possibility
exists that it will benefit from the seabed production ceiling to the
detriment of other ocean miners. Since the Enterprise is not required
to compete on an equal footing with other applicants, the Authority
may always allocate a portion of the production ceiling which is the
subject of conflicting applications to the Enterprise, regardless of
whether another applicant is better qualified. 147  In addition, since
the Authority may vary the applicability of its antispeculation or dili-
gence requirements, the Enterprise may be permitted to reserve
substantial portions of the production ceiling that would otherwise be
available to private contractors, whether or not it actually has the
wherewithal to bring such projects into commercial production. 1 4
Fourth, the Enterprise may be indirectly subsidized through its
access to the proprietary geological, technical, and other commer-
cially valuable data submitted to the Authority by other operators.
The data turnover requirements for contractors are very extensive,
and while disclosure of such data by "the Authority" is proscribed,
the draft treaty contains no explicit or implicit prohibition on disclo-
sure among the organs of the Authority, for example, from the Tech-
nical Commission to the Enterprise. 1 49  The potential for the transfer
of proprietary data to the Enterprise is heightened by provisions al-
lowing the Enterprise to share personnel with the other organs of the
Authority. 150
Fifth, the draft treaty grants the Authority sufficient discretion to
force applicants for contracts into joint ventures or other business ar-
rangements with the Enterprise as a condition of obtaining access.' 15
By using its virtually unlimited power to negotiate with applicants
concerning the terms and conditions of contracts, the Authority can
effectively coerce private companies into some form of partnership
145. See discussion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber in text accompanying note
235 supra.
146. See, e.g., NG1, Art. 150, 150 b/s; ICNT, Annex II, para. 6; Annex III, para.
1(b).
147. See note 141 supra.
148. See NG1, Art. 150 bis (2); ICNT, Annex II, para. 6; see also id. para. 5(d)(i).
149. ICNT, Annex II, para. 8.
150. See NG2, Annex I1, para. 10 ter.
151. ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(i). See also discussion of acquiring and maintaining
access in text accompanying note 2 supra.
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with the Enterprise. 152  Since the Authority can ultimately refuse to
grant the applicant access on any terms, it is self-evident that the
terms and conditions of partnerships with the Enterprise will be
heavily tilted in its favor.
It is important to note that the draft treaty gives the Authority
not only a stick to coerce operators into assisting the Enterprise but
also a carrot to entice them across the line. The Enterprise would
have the ability to give operators better financial terms, since it
would be exempt from Authority and national taxation, and possibly
to make available concessionary financing that is subsidized by either
state loan guarantees or Authority revenues. 153
Finally, the Enterprise would be virtually assured of attaining a
monopoly over ocean mining after the first twenty-five years of pro-
duction, if the Third World continues to adhere to this objective. The
draft treaty provides that a Review Conference would be convened
after the first twenty years to develop amendments to the system of
exploitation. 154  If the Conference does not reach agreement after
five years-an outcome the developing countries collectively can
ensure-the Third World-controlled Assembly would be empowered
to impose a moratorium on the issuance of new ocean mining con-
tracts to states and private companies while allowing the Enterprise
to undertake new projects in both reserved and non-reserved
areas. 1
55
C. Doing Business With The Enterprise
As has been demonstrated up to this point in the analysis of the
investment climate for private industry ocean mining under the draft
treaty, the prospective ocean miner would confront an extremely un-
stable business environment. He would be uncertain about whether
the Authority would ever grant him access to the resources on
economically tolerable terms and conditions. He would have no as-
152. Id.
153. See notes 119-27 supra and accompanying text. The draft treaty articles, how-
ever, are somewhat ambiguous as to the extent to which the Enterprise can negotiate
its own financial deal with joint venture partners. Paragraph 7 septies of Annex II,
NG2, provides for tax incentives to those contractors who enter joint arrangements
with the Enterprise; whether these incentives apply to financial obligations under
contracts only or impliedly impose Authority tax obligations on revenues earned by
entities from Enterprise joint venture operations is unclear.
154. NG1, Art. 153.
155. Id. Art. 153(6). See also discussion of the Review Conference in text accom-
panying note 164 infra.
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surance that subsequent actions of the Authority would not impair the
value of his investment. And he would be attempting to compete
with a highly subsidized intergovernmental mining entity. In this
situation, the prudent businessman would inevitably consider the
alternative investment strategy-doing business directly with the
Enterprise.
The Enterprise is essentially free to enter into any form of busi-
ness association with any other entities it chooses. 156  While a pros-
pective ocean mining company would have no assurance under the
draft treaty that the Enterprise would be willing to conclude a joint
arrangement, it could be virtually certain that, once the Enterprise
was satisfied with the terms of the deal, the Technical Commission
and Council would approve the proposed plan of work. 157  Under
both sides of the parallel system of exploitation established in the
draft treaty, therefore, access is discretionary with either the Author-
ity or Enterprise, depending on the circumstances. Under both sides,
the applicant must negotiate the terms of access with an entity whose
principal objective would appear to be the enhancement of the posi-
tion of the Enterprise in the field of ocean mining. What, then, are
the potential advantages of entering into a partnership with the En-
terprise?
First, there is a strong possibility that partnership with the En-
terprise may be the only avenue of access available to the private
company. This would be true in the event the Authority used its
discretion:
- to refuse to contract with private companies;158
- to allocate to the Enterprise a substantial portion of the permis-
sible production ceiling; 159
- to impose a quota on the number of contracts that may be is-
sued companies from any one state; ' 6 o or
- to impose a moratorium on issuing contracts to private com-
panies after the Review Conference failed to reach agreement. 16
1
156. See INCT, Annex II, para. 5(i).
157. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
158. See discussion of acquiring and maintaining access in text accompanying note
2 supra.
159. See notes 146-48 supra and accompanying text.
160. See NG1, Art. 150(f) (general policy of the Authority is to prevent monopoli-
zation); ICNT, Annex II, para 5(1) (inclusion of quota in final treaty is agreed in
principle).
161. See NG1, Art. 153(6).
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Second, there is a good chance that the Enterprise would be
prepared to offer a company that voluntarily entered into negotiations
with it, better terms and conditions, particularly for the first few joint
arrangements concluded. The reason is that the Enterprise would
have an interest in attracting private capital, technology, and manage-
rial expertise. Alternatively, the Technical Commission, which
negotiates the terms and conditions of contracts, might have an in-
terest in making contract requirements so onerous as to penalize
those operators who are unwilling to do business with the Enterprise.
Third, the Enterprise offers the private company the attractive
position of working with the Authority's favorite son as opposed to
being an unwanted stepchild on the other side of the parallel system.
All of the discriminatory benefits enjoyed by the Enterprise in terms
of more relaxed regulation and supervision would also inure to the
benefit of the Enterprise's partners. In a regulatory system that so
heavily depends on the political vicissitudes of the Third World, this
advantage can be determinative.
Obviously, doing business with the Enterprise is not the panacea
to private industry's dilemma under the draft treaty regime. The
negotiation of a joint arrangement is bound to be fraught with difficul-
ties, because the draft articles contain absolutely no guidance con-
cerning the form of such an arrangement nor the basic terms of which
it would be comprised. 1 62 As the Enterprise would hold the stronger
bargaining hand in the negotiation of the joint venture agreement-
because the applicant's alternatives for ocean mining may be nonexis-
tent or much less desirable-the treaty's failure to establish the basic
ground rules of Enterprise joint arrangements could generate serious
problems.
Probably the most important requirement that would be absent
is that Enterprise participation in the management and profits of the
joint venture should correspond to its financial contribution to the
joint venture. As long as the Enterprise has its own capital at risk,
the chances that it will be a good business partner are maximized. If
it is in a position to demand a "free ride" from the other joint venture
partners, however, the necessary commonality of objectives will be
162. The Statute of the Enterprise does not even mention the possibility that the
Enterprise would enter joint arrangements with private companies, much less pro-
vide any guidance as to the form and conditions of such arrangements. ICNT, Annex
III. The only restrictions on the Enterprise's discretion which might be applicable in
this regard concern a requirement that it generally procure goods and services
through competitive bidding. Id. para 11(c).
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missing, and private industrial ventures will hesitate to enter into
joint arrangements.
The key issue raised by a requirement that the Enterprise con-
tribute equity capital to any joint venture it enters centers around the
source of such capital. As described in preceding sections of this arti-
cle, the Enterprise under the present draft treaty would have finan-
cial resources initially made available by States Parties through the
Authority. If its joint ventures are successful, the Enterprise will earn
revenues which it can reinvest in new ocean mining projects. What is
clear from a private investor's point of view, however, is that the
Enterprise's equity must be genuine risk capital in order to ensure
that there is a real community of interests in the joint venture; it
cannot be the mere contribution of deep seabed resources or the
granting of access, as such are available to contractors under the other
side of the parallel system.
Moreover, the possibility that the Enterprise would pursue non-
commercial objectives in its participation in the joint mining project,
even where it has contributed genuine equity, cannot be ignored.
163
For example, the draft treaty expressly requires the Enterprise to
give preferences in its procurement practices for developing country
goods and services. 16 4 There is the serious risk that the Enterprise
(which would be controlled by the Third World collectively, which
would in turn, be heavily influenced by land-based producers) would
not have as its principal objective in the project, the development of
the resources at a profit. Unlike the other participants in the joint
venture, it may seek to retard seabed production in order to protect
land-based producing countries from competition.
There are no easy solutions to the problem of incompatible ob-
jectives in a joint venture with the Enterprise. One approach that
might be of some value would be to include in the treaty a set of
mandatory principles guiding the Enterprise's policies and decisions,
and indeed its actions in any joint ventures it enters. Such principles
would need to provide that the Enterprise act in accordance with the
profit motive, pursue an aggressive development policy, and follow
accepted business norms. Adherence to these principles would, of
163. Note that the Enterprise is not to be influenced by the political character of
states in carrying out its functions and is to be guided solely by economic considera-
tions. ICNT, Annex III, para. l(f). However, economic considerations may cover a
variety of Third World objectives and are not necessarily synonomous with commer-
cial or business concerns.
164. ICNT, Annex III, para. 11(C)(ii)(b).
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course, be very difficult to police. Yet, legislating these norms in the
treaty could assist in creating a sense of purpose and direction that
would otherwise be lacking in the early years of Enterprise opera-
tions; it could generate investor confidence that the Enterprise and
private companies could share similar objectives and successfully un-
dertake a mining project jointly.
Finally, it is unclear whether, under the draft treaty, the Enter-
prise is required to respect the sanctity of contracts to which it is a
party and whether the Enterprise partners would have access to ef-
fective dispute settlement procedures.'6 5
Because the state and private company side of the parallel sys-
tem of exploitation established under the draft treaty is so defective
in its provisions for guaranteed security of tenure and dispute settle-
ment,16 6 private industry probably has little to lose, with more to
gain, by moving voluntarily into the Enterprise side of the system,
rather than being ultimately forced to do so. The key point, however,
is that the risks of deepsea mining on either side of the presently
envisioned parallel system are probably too high to allow private in-
vestment.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE
One of the essential components of the draft treaty regime under
negotiation is the provision for the Review Conference, to be con-
vened twenty years after the approval of the first contract or plan of
work under the convention.' 6 7 The function of this Conference of all
States Parties would be to review the treaty's provisions on the sys-
tem of exploitation and adopt an "agreement" concerning these pro-
visions.' 68 Presumably, this agreement would take the form of
amendments to the convention, which would enter into force for
States Parties according to the convention's final clauses. 6 9
165. See NG1, Art. 151(6) (contracts with the Authority have security of tenure);
ICNT, Annex II, para. 13(b) (revision to contracts requires consent of both parties);
ICNT, Art. 187(2)(a), (b) (the Enterprise may not be sued for violating the conven-
tion, misuse of power or similar grounds); Art. 187(c) (Chamber has jurisdiction over
disputes "relating to the interpretation or application of any contract concerning ac-
tivities in the Area").
166. See notes 77-94 infra and accompanying text.
167. NG1, Art. 153.
168. See id. Art. 153(1), (6).
169. Part XVI of the ICNT presently contains no provisions establishing a proce-
dure for bringing amendments to the Convention into force.
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The final article on the Review Conference expressly provides
that the decisions of the Conference will "not affect rights acquired
under existing contracts." 170 This clause could theoretically be read
to assure absolute security of tenure for those states and private com-
panies engaged in ocean mining under contracts issued by the Au-
thority during the twenty-year period before the Conference is con-
vened and during the time in which the Conference is in session.
171
For the prospective ocean mining investor, however, the cer-
tainty that a Review Conference will be organized twenty years after
the operation of the regime commences, nevertheless generates in-
stability. The reason is that The Review Conference's interpretation
of this grandfather rights clause is unpredictable for the following
reasons: 172
1. The primary concern is that, while the clause provides that
rights shall not be affected, it does not state that the terms and
conditions of contracts will remain the same, 172 thus, leaving
the door opened to a mandatory renegotiation of contracts
under a new regime adopted by the Conference.
2. It is also likely that the revised system of exploitation will ac-
cord the Authority just as much discretionary power as the
existing system and that the value of these grandfather rights
would be greatly diminished through their implementation.
3. Assuming the Third World continues to support an operating
monopoly for the Enterprise, the risk clearly exists that the re-
vised system would reinforce the monopoly position of the En-
terprise and thus totally eliminate the contractor's ability to
compete in metals markets (already seriously eroded by the
subsidies given the Enterprise under the existing system of
exploitation). 174
4. It is unclear whether the grandfather rights provision applies to
contracts between private companies and the Enterprise.175
In addition to the unpredictable effect of the Review Confer-
ence's outcome on the security of investments made under existing
170. NG1, Art. 153(5).
171. Paragraph 6 of Article 153, NG1, can be read to require the Authority to
continue issuing contracts until a new agreement enters into force or the Review
Conference has been in session for five years, whichever occurs first. But see notes
177-78 infra and accompany text.
172. See NG1, Art. 153(4) (Conference establishes its own decisionmaking proce-
dures).
173. Id. Art. 153(5).
174. See note 185 infra and accompanying text.
175. See NG1, Art. 153(5).
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contracts, it will adversely impact the prospective ocean miner's as-
sessment of the growth potential in this new field. In order to justify
the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars in developing the
technological capability to enter ocean mining, a private industrial
venture seeks some assurance that it will be able to engage in a sec-
ond mining project to offset the high risks initially assumed in deploy-
ing a new technology. Without this assurance, the economic returns
from first-generation ocean mining may not be sufficient to attract the
massive private investment required. The chance of obtaining a sec-
ond contract with the Authority under the draft treaty is already di-
minished by the seabed production ceiling and the potential for state
quotas. 176 The Review Conference provision would all but destroy
any opportunity for expansion by this pioneering industry:
First, the Authority is likely to defer the issuance of contracts in
the latter years of the period before the Review Conference in order
to ensure that new seabed production comes in under a revised sys-
tem of exploitation, even though the draft article on the Review Con-
ference would appear to mandate the continued award of contracts
until the new agreement enters into force. 1 7 7 The discretionary sys-
tem of access under the existing draft convention would certainly
allow this slow-down. 178 And the Third World would no doubt seek
to use its control over the Authority to gain maximum bargaining
leverage at the Review Conference by holding hostage the indus-
trialized countries' access to the resources. 179
Second, the draft treaty would permit this slow-down on the is-
suance of contracts to be converted into a moratorium after five years
of negotiation at the Review Conference.' 8 0 At that time, the As-
sembly is empowered to decide that no new ocean mining contracts
will be issued.' 8 The Assembly may extend the moratorium to new
mining operations by the Enterprise in non-reserved areas, but it
need not do so in order to impose the moratorium on new con-
tracts.182  It is prohibited from adopting a moratorium on the ap-
176. See notes 14, 51-57 supra and accompanying text.
177. See NGI, Art. 153(6).
178. See discussion of acquiring and maintaining access in text accompanying note
2 supra.
179. See discussion of powers and decisionmaking procedures of the Authority in
text accompanying note 186 infra.
180. NGI, Art. 153(6).
181. Id.
182. Id. ("Assembly may decide ... that no new contracts or plans of work ...
shall be approved") (emphasis added).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
proval of the ocean mining projects in reserved areas, where the En-
terprise and possibily developing countries have priority rights of
access.1 8 3 Thus, the Third World, which would dictate the Assembly's
decision on this matter, could deny access to states and private com-
panies while permitting the Enterprise to become the exclusive ocean
miner. Since these countries collectively could also ensure that the
Review Conference never reached agreement on a revised system of
exploitation, the outcome would be a permanent Enterprise
monopoly. 114
Third, the negotiating clout granted the Third World in the Re-
view Conference by these provisions would virtually guarantee that it
could shape the revised system of exploitation to satisfy its objec-
tives. 18 5 Accordingly, the prospective ocean miner could not reason-
ably rely on his own government's ability to protect its interest in
continued state and private company access to deep seabed resources.
V. POWERS AND DECISIONMAKING OF THE ORGANS
OF THE AUTHORITY.
The final task in the evaluation of the investment climate for
ocean mining which would be established under the draft treaty is to
examine the assumption made throughout the analysis that the Au-
thority will use its discretionary powers to achieve the expressed ob-
jectives of the Third World. The validity of this assumption in large
part depends on who controls the Authority's decisions.
This analysis is divided into two parts. The first part describes
the composition, decisionmaking procedures, and powers of the vari-
ous components of the Authority-the Assembly, Council, technical
commissions, and, although not technically an organ of the. Authority,
the Seabed Disputes Chamber. The second part selects a hypothetical
problem that might be the subject of Authority action and illustrates
how these decisionmaking components are likely to operate.
A. Composition, Decisionmaking Procedures, and Powers of the Or-
gans of the Seabed Authority
1. The Assembly.
(a) Composition and Decisionmaking.
183. Id.
184. Id. (moratorium lasts until new agreement enters into force).
185. See discussion of Third World objectives in text accompanying note 6 supra
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The Assembly would be composed of all States Parties. 1 6 It
would meet at least annually, and provision is also made for special
sessions. 187
In all respects, the Assembly would be dominated by the Third
World collectively. First, each state party has one vote, 188 and sub-
stantive decisions would be made by a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bers present and voting (assuming it represents a majority of the
members participating in any session)."8 9 Thus, the thirty-odd indus-
trialized countries, even if they voted as a cohesive block (and this is
unlikely, if previous experience at the Law of the Sea Conference is a
guide), could not prevent adverse decisions. Second, the "two pro-
cedural devices included in the draft treaty for the purpose of delay-
ing Assembly action in order to protect minority groups (i.e., indus-
trialized countries) require affirmative action by either one-fifth or
one-fourth of the members. 190 As a result, highly industrialized
countries would not necessarily have these devices available even to
slow down Group of 77 steamroller tactics in the Assembly, unless
they won support of almost all other "developed" countries.' 9 1
186. ICNT, Art. 157(1).
187. Id. Art. 157(2).
188. Id. Art. 157(5).
189. Id. Art. 157(6).
190. Article 157(8) of the ICNT provides that one-fifth of the members of the As-
sembly may delay a vote on a particular matter for five days; while the Rules of
Procedure for the Law of the Sea Conference permit this same cooling-off procedure
to be invoked by 15 states, the draft treaty would expand the requisite number to
approximately 26-28; Rules of Procedure, Rule 37(2)(a), U.N. Doc.A/Conf.62/
WP.30/Rev. 1 (1974). Article 157(10) of the ICNT provides that Assembly action may
be delayed, if one-fourth of the members of the Assembly request an advisory opin-
ion from the Seabed Disputes Chamber.
Article 25 of Part I of the 1976 Revised Single Negotiating Text contained more
meaningful procedural protections for minority groups in Assembly voting. U.N
Doc.A/Conf. 62/WP.8/Rev.1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RSNTJ. First, the "cooling-off
period" could be invoked upon the request of 15 states, rather than one-fifth of the
members of the Assembly. RSNT, Part I, Art. 25(a). Second, paragraph 8 of Article
25 provided that Assembly decisions would not come into effect for 90 days following
the end of the session in which they were adopted and that, if one-third of the
Assembly's members objected to a particular decision during that 90 day period, it
would be stayed pending reconsideration at a Special Session. Id. And, third, para-
graph 8 of Article 25 also implied that important questions of substance would be
decided by consensus. Id.
191. Highly industrialized countries with a direct interest in undertaking ocean
mining at the present time number less than ten. In order to invoke the special
procedural protections of Article 157 of the ICNT, these countries would have to
garner support from all industrialized countries (including some major land-based
producers, such as Norway and Australia), the Socialist bloc countries, and some of
the marginally "developed" countries, such as Portugal, Greece, and Turkey.
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(b) Powers.
As distinguished from the one-nation, one-vote plenary bodies of
other international organizations, the Assembly of the Authority
would have substantial powers. It would be responsible for establish-
ing general policies on any issue within the competence of the Au-
thority, 192 an organization which in itself would have an unpre-
cedented power to make binding decisions affecting the economic in-
terests of States Parties. 19 3 The draft treaty characterizes the Assem-
bly as "the supreme organ of the Authority," 194 and requires all other
organs, the Council in particular, to act in conformity with the As-
sembly's 'general policies. 195 It is self-evident that the characteriza-
tion of the Assembly as "supreme" would give the Assembly the
power to overturn the decisions of other organs. 196 This is even
more true since the Assembly alone can interpret the term, "su-
preme." In addition to its general policy-making powers, and the
power to elect the members of the Council and the Seabed Disputes
Chamber of the Tribunal, 197 the Assembly is specifically entrusted
with the power to adopt, as well as order amendments to the rules,
regulations, and procedures that will govern the ability of states and
192. ICNT, Art. 158(1).
193. To illustrate, the present draft treaty empowers the Authority to determine
the conditions pursuant to which states will have access to the mineral resources of
two-thirds of the earth's surface, to exercise international taxing power with respect
to deep seabed mining, and to itself conduct commercial mining, processing, and
marketing operations. Id. Part XI.
194. Id. Art. 158(1).
195. The Council is specifically directed to act in conformity with the Assembly's
general policies. Id. Art. 160(1). Moreover, both the Assembly and the Council are
required to "act in a manner compatible with the distribution of powers and func-
tions" between themselves. Id. Art. 156(4). As long as the Assembly is the "supreme"
organ, this vague separation of powers provision requires the Council to act in a
subordinate role vis-a-vis the Assembly.
196. In addition, the legislative history of the draft treaty reenforces the interpre-
tation that the Assembly can override Council decisions. Under the RSNT, the As-
sembly was also characterized as the "supreme" organ with general policy-making
powers. RSNT, Part I, Art. 26, 28. The RSNT, however, expressly required the
Assembly to avoid actions which impeded the exercise of specific powers entrusted to
other organs such as the Council. Id. Art. 24(4), 26(3). The ICNT merely includes a
general requirement on all organs "to act in a manner compatible with the distribu-
tion of powers and functions among the various organs." ICNT, Art. 156(4). This
latter provision permits an interpretation that the Assembly, as the "supreme" organ,
can through its policy-making powers overrule the Council; and that interpretation is
bolstered by the deletion of the RSNT's separation of powers provision, which would
not have permitted the same argument.
197. ICNT, Art. 158(2)(i), (iii).
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private companies to acquire access to deep seabed resources. 198
None of the Assembly's decisions on policy or regulations would be
subject to review by the Seabed Disputes Chamber. 199
2. The Council.
(a) Composition and Decisionmaking.
Although the composition and voting procedures of the Council
is an issue that remains to be seriously negotiated, certain premises
now appear to be generally accepted. 200  First, the Council will be
composed of about thirty-six members, approximately half of whom
will represent "special interests," with the other half selected on the
basis of equitable geographical representation.
20 1
Second, the election of Council members will be entrusted to
the Assembly. 20 2  The draft article presently under consideration
would give the Assembly wide latitude to decide which states satis-
fied the criteria for membership in various special interest
categories. 203 For instance, there is no assurance that the United
States would be elected to the Council under the present formula-
tion, 20 4 although as a practical matter the Soviet Union is guaranteed
198. Id. Art. 158(2)(xvi). See also id. Art. 160(2)(xiv) (the Council impliedly must
amend regulations as ordered by the Assembly), Annex II, para. 11 (illustrating the
range of subjects covered by regulations).
199. ICNT, Art. 191.
200. The following discussion draws upon the Chairman's Report for Negotiating
Group 3 at the Seventh Session (LOS Conf. Doe. NG3/2, May 12, 1978), as well as
the statement of the United States position on Article 159 contained in the unclas-
sified U.S. Delegation Report for the Geneva meeting of the Seventh Session at
19-20.
201. See ICNT, Art. 159(1). "Special interests" represented included countries that
have made the greatest contribution to ocean mining, major mineral importers, major
mineral exporters, and developing countries, as well as land-locked and possibly
coastal states. Id.
202. Id. Art. 158(2)(i); id. Art. 159(1), (3).
203. Id. Art. 159(1). For example, there is no requirement that the "ocean min-
ing" category be composed entirely of highly industrialized, or even developed,
countries. Id. Art. 159(1)(a). The Assembly could decide that the "substantial invest-
ment" criterion was satisfied by any country which had participated in deep seabed
scientific research programs, and then elect the four "ocean mining" members from
among a large group of countries. To take another example, the concept of "major
importer" and "major exporter" is not defined. Id. Art. 159(1)(b), (c). The Assembly
could interpret "major importer" to mean those countries which import the greatest
quantity of minerals or, alternatively, those countries for whom mineral imports rep-
resent the highest proportion of GNP.
204. Id. Art. 159(1). There are perhaps ten countries which might legitimately
qualify for membership in the four-seat ocean mining category. Depending upon the
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Council membership. 205 Thus, the United States would have to rely
on Assembly recognition of political realities in the election of the
Council, a reliance that may be appropriate for the first Council elec-
tion, but is of questionable validity over the long-term.
20 6
Third, the voting procedures of the council may give indus-
trialized countries the power to block decisions but will inevitably
give developing countries the same power. The United States has
maintained that the industrialized countries represented in the ocean
mining and mineral imports categories must have a blocking vote, a
position that would give a handful of developing country Council
members an equally effective veto..20 7 The Group of 77 continues to
support "majoritarian" decisionmaking. 20 8
(b) Powers.
The Council will be responsible for establishing the "specific
policies" of the Authority; 209 authorizing mining operations by states
and private companies, as well as by the Enterprise; 210 provisionally
establishing the basic conditions governing mining operations through
rules and regulations; 2 11 supervising mining activities;2 12 and imple-
menting price and production controls. 21 3
criteria used, the U.S. might not qualify as a "'major importer" and, although it is the
world's largest copper producer, would certainly not qualify as a "major exporter."
205. See id. Art. 159(1)(a) (one of the four ocean mining seats must be allocated to
a Socialist country); Art. 159(1)(b) (one of the four major importers must be a Socialist
state).
206. Although Council members are eligible for reelection, "due regard should be
paid to the desirability of rotating seats." Id. Art. 159(4). While the United States
should qualify for Council membership in the ocean mining category, the major im-
porter category, and as a member of the Western Europe and other geographic reg-
ion, it is highly unlikely that it will be permitted to enjoy permanent Council mem-
bership when competing for seats with numerous other ocean mining states and the
30-member WEO group.
207. The current U.S. proposal is that substantive Council decisions would require
a three-fourths majority of the Council, including a simple majority in three of the
four special interest categories, or four of the five total categories. U.S. Delegation
Report for the Seventh Session, at 19-20. This proposal could effectively permit four
negative votes (two in the ocean mining chamber and two in the major importers
chamber) to block Council action.
208. See ICNT, Art. 159(7) (substantive Council decisions require a three-fourths
vote of members present and voting, provided it includes a majority of the members
participating in the session).
209. Id. Art. 160(1).
210. Id. Art. 160(2)(x).
211. Id. Art. 160(2)(xiv).
212. Id. Art. 160(2)(i), (xi).
213. Id. Art. 160(2)(xii).
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However, it will be mandatory that the Council act "in confor-
mity with" the Assembly's general policies. 214  Since judicial review
of Council policy and other discretionary determinations is precluded
under the draft treaty, 215 the Council presumably has some leeway in
implementing the Assembly's decisions. The political and practical
significance of this potential independence is limited, however, by
the following factors:
- First, the draft treaty can be interpreted so as to require the
Council to amend the rules and regulations governing ocean min-
ing operations in accordance with the Assembly's directions.
2 16
- Second, the ability of the Council to act in contravention of the
Assembly's policies would depend upon the concurrence of de-
veloping country Council members, the same political interest
group which controls the Assembly. Under some proposals, indus-
trialized countries might be able to block Council actions based
upon unacceptable Assembly policies, but the result would be
stalemate. Whether the industrialized countries could maintain sol-
idarity in this situation is questionable, since they would be acting
in contravention of the treaty requirement that the Council be
subordinate to the Assembly.
- Third, the Assembly has the power to reconstitute the Council
every two years, 217 at which time its discretion in deciding which
countries represent the special interest categories would permit
replacement of recalcitrant industrialized countries.
- Finally, conflict between the Council and the Assembly, or
stalemate on the Council as a result of industrialized country block-
ing action, means that the implementation of the treaty regime
would be lodged by default in the Technical Commission. 218
This latter point is illustrated by the procedure contained in the
draft treaty for the Council's approval of contracts for mining by pri-
vate companies and of plans of work for Enterprise operations.
2 19
Once submitted to the Council by the Technical Commission, a con-
tract would be automatically approved, unless the Council takes an
affirmative decision within sixty days to disapprove of it. 220 In com-
214. Id. Art. 160(1). See also id. Art. 156(4).
215. Id. Art. 191.
216. Id. Art. 160(2)(xiv).
217. Id. Art. 159(3) (election of half the membership of the Council takes place
every two years).
218. See further discussion of the Technical Commission in text accompanying note
23 infra.
219. Id. Art. 160(2)(x).
220. Id.
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bination with a decision of the Council, on which the United States
and like-minded countries have a blocking vote, the procedure would
appear to assure the automatic approval of contracts. However, the
real power in the contract approval process lies with the Technical
Commission, since the Council cannot act on the contract until it is
submitted by the Commission.2 21 In the case of a Council stalemate
between developing country members and industrialized country
members, the Technical Commission would be free of Council super-
vision and, in its discretion, could refuse to submit contract applica-
tions to the Council for approval, insist on contract conditions so
onerous that no applicant could be in a position to conclude a con-
tract, or negotiate discriminatory deals with the Enterprise and sub-
mit them for automatic Council approval.2 2 2  In none of these situa-
tions would the industrialized country members of the Council have
the ability to mitigate the adverse impact of the Technical Commis-
sion's discretion. Obviously, this problem could be mitigated, though
not completely eliminated, by requiring the Technical Commission to
take a positive decision within a stated time period so as to ensure
that these matters reach the Council.
3. The Commissions.
(a) Composition and Decisionmaking.
The draft treaty establishes three subsidiary organs of the
Council-the Economic Planning Commission, the Technical Com-
mission, and the Rules and Regulations Commission. 223 Members of
each of these commissions are elected by the Council, pursuant to
criteria concerning qualifications set forth in the treaty. 2 24 Under the
most favorable Council voting proposals, industrialized countries
would be able to block election of unqualified or biased individuals to
commission membership. 2 25  The general requirement, however,
that the composition of each commission reflect equitable geographic
representation, means that the dominant voice on the commissions
will be that of the Third World. 22 6 Since each of the commissions
221. See NG1, Art. 151(3); ICNT, Art. 160(2)(x).
222. The draft treaty procedures for the award of access are sufficiently discretion-
ary as to permit any of these actions. See discussion of acquiring and maintaining
access in text accompanying note 2 supra.
223. ICNT, Art. 161(1).
224. Id. Art. 161(1)(b), 162(1), 163(1), 164(1).
225. See note 207 supra.
226. ICNT, Art. 161(1)(b) (Technical Commission and Rules and Regulations
Commission shall be appointed "with due regard" to the principle of equitable geo-
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adopts decisions through a two-thirds majority vote, 22 7 the objectivity
of commission decisions will depend on the extent to which develop-
ing country members view their function as technical, rather than
political.
(b) Powers of the Economic Planning Commission.
The Economic Planning Commission probably has the greatest
political visibility, because it is responsible for monitoring the impact
of ocean mining on world markets and recommending actions that the
Council may take to implement the Authority's price and production
control powers through conclusion of commodity agreements. 228
Since the Economic Planning Commission has no independent pow-
ers, and since its failure to act would, in fact, be a deterrent to the
implementation of price and production restrictions, 22 9 the ability of
the United States and like-minded countries to block Council actions
recommended by the Economic Planning Commission would proba-
bly be an adequate safeguard.
(c) Powers of the Rules and Regulations Commission.
Similarly, the Rules and Regulations Commission, which is re-
sponsible for drafting the Authority's initial regulations and any sub-
sequent amendments has no independent functions. 230  If it recom-
mends unsatisfactory regulations, a Council in which industrialized
countries exercised a blocking vote would reject its recommendations.
The protection afforded by such a power of this Council, however, is
subject to two qualifications. First, a stalemate in the Council on the
adoption or amendment of regulations may be contrary to deep sea-
bed mining interests, as in the case where initial regulations are de-
layed and contracts cannot be issued, or where an amendment to the
regulations is necessary to permit economic operations or the de-
ployment of a new technology. Secondly, unlike questions concerning
price and production controls, the United States may not always be
able to rely on the support of like-minded industrialized countries.
graphical representation and special interests); Art. 162(J) (appointments to the
Economic Planning Commission shall "take into account the need for equitable geo-
graphical distribution").
227. ICNT , Art. 161(8) (commission decisions require two-thirds vote of members
present and voting).
228. Id. Art. 162(3), (5), (6).
229. Id. Art. 160(2)(xii) (the Council may act "upon the recommendation of the
Economic Planning Commission").
230. See id. Art. 164.
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When the Council votes on these regulations, since alternative formu-
lations may have different impacts on ocean mining competitors.
(d) Powers of the Technical Commission.
The problems of a Council stalemate as a result of both indus-
trialized country and developing country Council vetos becomes most
acute for the Technical Commission. The Commission has a wide
range of independent powers, such as the supervision and inspection
of ocean mining activities, the issuance of emergency suspension or-
ders, the initiation of judicial proceedings against contractors and the
collection of financial payments from contractors. 23 1 As described
above, equitable geographical representation on the Technical Com-
mission means that its developing country members will exercise full
control over decisions subject to Council supervision.2 32 If the
Council is stalemated, it will not be able to exercise supervision over
these independent commission functions which have direct impact on
the security of investments made under contracts. To the extent that
such functions are deemed to be discretionary, contractors will have
no recourse to judicial review.2 3 3
Moreover, the Technical Commission is responsible for ensuring
that Enterprise operations satisfy the same conditions and comply
with the same regulations as those of contractors. 234  Its diligence
and avoidance of discriminatory favoritism regarding the Enterprise
would be an important ingredient in the maintenance of a fair parallel
system. The inability of industrialized country Council members to
assure adequate, affirmative supervision of the Technical Commission
means that an entity controlled by developing countries, has the vir-
tually unchecked power to subvert the parallel system and ensure the
predominance of the Enterprise.
Finally, as discussed under the description of the Council's pow-
ers, the draft treaty, coupled with a Council whose composition and
voting procedures are favorable to the interests of the United States,
would give the Technical Commission absolute control over the award
of contracts.
231. Id. Art. 163(2).
232. Id. Art. 161(1)(b).
233. Id. Art. 191.
234. See id. Art. 163(2) (all of the Commission's functions apply equally to contrac-
tors and the Enterprise); Annex II, para. 6 (the Enterprise must comply with the
Authority's regulations).
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4. The Seabed Disputes Chamber.
(a) Composition.
The draft treaty establishes a Seabed Disputes Chamber within
the Law of the Sea Tribunal and jurisdiction over certain disputes
between the Authority and States Parties or their nationals. 2 35
Twenty-one Tribunal members are elected to the Chamber by a two-
thirds vote of States Parties,2 3 6 and eleven from among the Tribunal
are elected to the Seabed Disputes Chamber by the Assembly, pur-
suant to a two-thirds vote. 23 7 At neither stage in the election process
would highly industrialized countries have a special voice, either
through the Seabed Authority's Council or any other body.
If the Law of the Sea Tribunal develops into a politically biased,
nonobjective organ, States Parties generally have the opportunity to
avoid its jurisdiction and opt for arbitration or the International Court
of Justice.2 38  This opportunity is, however, foreclosed in the case of
deep seabed disputes, unless all parties to the dispute agree to arbi-
tration.2 3 9  If the Chamber is biased in favor of the Authority, it is
highly unlikely that the Authority would agree to opt out of its juris-
diction.
(b) Jurisdiction.
The draft treaty provides for compulsory, binding adjudication of
disputes where matters, such as the following, are concerned:
- allegations by states, applicants for contracts, and contractors,
that an Authority decision or measure violates the convention or
the Authority's regulations, exceeds the Authority's jurisdiction, or
is a misuse of power;2 40 and
- the interpretation or application of any ocean mining contract. 241
However, this apparent jurisdiction is directly contradicted by
another provision of the draft treaty which prohibits the Chamber
235. ICNT, Annex V, Art. 15.
236. Id. Art. 2(1), 4(4).
237. ICNT, Art. 157(6), 158(2)(iii); ICNT, Annex V, Art. 37.
238. See ICNT, Art. 287(1).
239. Id. Art. 188, 287(2).
240. Id. Art. 187(2)(a), (b).
241. Id. Art. 187(2)(c). The Chamber also has jursidiction over disputes concerning
allegations by the Authority that a state party has violated the deep seabed provisions
of the treaty; allegations that a member of the secretariat has a conflict of interest or
has disclosed proprietary information; suspension of a state party's membership; and
deep seabed-related disputes between states parties or between a national of a state
party and another state party or its nationals. Id. Art. 187(2)(d), (e); Art. 189.
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from ruling whether a particular rule, regulation, or procedure is in
conformity with the convention. 242  The only question which the
Chamber may address is whether the Authority has correctly applied
the regulation in a particular instance.
2 43
In addition, the Chamber is prohibited from exercising jurisdic-
tion over the discretionary acts of the Assembly, Council, or the
Council's subsidiary organs ( e.g., the Technical Commission).244 The
"discretionary powers" of the Authority are not defined. Thus, the
power to "negotiate" contract terms may be discretionary, and the
same would be true of the refusal to conclude a contract or the selec-
tion from among conflicting contract applications. Certainly, the gen-
eral policies of the Assembly, which the Council must follow, would
be deemed to be discretionary.
Two further ambiguities in the dispute settlement draft articles
are important. First, the compulsory, binding jurisdiction of the
Chamber may be avoided if parties agree under a contract to submit
future disputes either to binding arbitration procedures contained in
the draft treaty or some other, unspecified form of arbitration. 245 This
open-ended provision, when coupled with broad Authority discretion-
ary power in the negotiation and conclusion of contracts, permits the
Authority to insist that contractors agree to an Authority-determined
form of arbitration as the price of obtaining a contract. Secondly, the
draft articles are unclear as to whether private companies which enter
into contracts with the Enterprise have access to the Chamber. 246
5. Conclusions.
Based on the structure and relative powers of the various organs
of the Authority described above, certain conclusions about the loca-
tion of political control in the Seabed Authority emerge.
The Assembly, unquestionably dominated by the Third World, is
a primary, if not the exclusive, political power center. Its power is
242. ICNT, Art. 191.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. Art. 188.
246. Id. Art. 187(a), (b) (Chamber jurisdiction over contractor challenges to deci-
sions Assembly, Council, or Council's subsidiary organs); id. Art. 187(2)(c) (Chamber
jurisdiction over interpretation or application of "any contract concerning activities in
the Area").
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derived primarily from its characterization as the "supreme" organ, its
unrestricted policy-making powers and its freedom to interfere with
the functions of other organs. In addition, the requirement that the
Council-the only counter-force to the Assembly's power-follow its
policy decisions, the ability to require amendments to the Authority's
rules and regulations governing access, and the freedom from judicial
review of its policies and actions on rules and regulations, are other
sources of the Assembly's power.
Within the framework of the present draft treaty, the Council
cannot be relied upon to serve as an effective check against Third
World control over the Authority. If present U.S. objectives concern-
ing the composition and voting procedures of the Council are satisfied
(and this may be difficult), the United States and similarly-minded
countries would share negative control over Council decisions with
developing countries. As a result, the Council would have serious
difficulty in making decisions, and its importance as a power center
would necessarily diminish in comparison to the "supreme" Assembly
and the powerful international bureaucracy, the Technical Commis-
sion and Enterprise.
Since a Council with deadlock potential appears to be the most
favorable outcome possible in the present negotiations, the only avail-
able means of circumscribing Third World control over the Authority
is to reduce the power of both the Assembly and the international
bureaucracy. The existence of binding dispute settlement under the
draft treaty is now totally ineffective as a check on these two organs
because there is no assurance that the Assembly elected Seabed Dis-
putes Chamber will be an impartial body. The Chamber has no juris-
diction over the Assembly's political actions and, even if it did, would
have to give effect to the Assembly's "supremacy." In addition, the
Chamber has no jurisdiction over the discretionary acts of the
bureaucracy; even if it did, it would have no objective criteria and
standards against which to judge the legitimacy of decisions affecting
access to the resources.
B. Decisionmaking in the Seabed Authority-A Probable Scenario
In order to illustrate the present defects in the structure and
inter-relationship of the Authority's organs, as constituted under the
draft treaty articles, the following hypothetical problem will be
considered:
The Group of 77 members of the Authority adopt the position that
all processing plants for ocean mining operations should be located
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in developing countries in order to implement the principle that
the resources are the common heritage of mankind; they seek to
influence the Authority to impose this requirement.
At first glance, this hypothetical position of the Group of 77
would appear to be an extreme example because it seems to con-
tradict the terms of the draft treaty, which does not purport to give
the Authority regulatory powers over ocean mining-related activities
that occur on land. 247 Nevertheless, as will be seen in the develop-
ment of the scenario below, the present draft treaty would permit the
Group of 77 to achieve this objective in an immediate and direct
manner. Moreover, this same Third World objective could, as a prac-
tical matter, be satisfied, even if the United States were to achieve its
objectives in the composition and voting of the Council; it might even
be achievable in the event Authority actions are subject to complete
judicial review. 48
Assuming that the Group of 77 agreed to pursue the objective of
requiring all ocean mining processing to be located in developing
countries, there are a variety of Authority actions permitted under
the draft treaty that might accomplish the desired result, such as:
- the Assembly's adoption of a general policy;
- the Council's provisional adoption of a blanket requirement in
regulations, followed by Assembly approval;
- the Technical Commission's insistence that processing in develop-
ing countries be a condition to the award of any contracts;
- the Technical Commission's use of the location of processing as a
criterion for selecting among conflicting contract applications;
- a provision in the regulations for tax incentives to contractors
who locate their operations in the Third World;
- forcing all contractors to enter into joint ventures with the En-
terprise, which, in turn, insists on locating processing in a develop-
ing country.
The following discussion commences with the Assembly debate
of the Group of 77's hypothetical position and proceeds through the
various steps that could be taken to implement an Assembly resolu-
tion that adopts the position as a general policy of the Seabed Author-
ity.
247. See, e.g., ICNT, Art. 133(a) ("activities in the Area" means all exploration and
exploitation of deepsea resources); ICNT, Art. 134(5) (activities in the Area are gov-
erned by the convention); NG1, Art. 151(4) (the Authority exercises control over
activities in the Area).
248. See discussion of the Council and the Seabed Disputes Chamber in text ac-
companying note 235 supra.
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1. Assembly Action.
At the first Assembly meeting, the Group of 77 would introduce
a resolution declaring the general policy of the Authority to be that
processing activities associated with ocean mining, whether they be
conducted by states, private parties, or the Enterprise, must be lo-
cated in developing countries. The Group of 77 would argue that the
convention necessarily contemplates that the Authority take into ac-
count the location of processing plants in carrying out its mandate to
ensure full participation of developing countries in the benefits of
ocean mining. 249 The argument would be based on the reasoning
that the location of a processing plant in a developing country repre-
sents the most direct way that that country could benefit from ocean
mining and the most logical form of participation, since few develop-
ing countries possess the necessary capital to simply purchase out-
right, substantial equity in an ocean mining project.
Developed countries, on the other hand, would argue that the
location of nodule processing plants operated by contractors is a sub-
ject outside the Authority's treaty mandate. Because the processing
restriction would be viewed by developed countries as an important
issue of principle with respect to containing the Authority's regulatory
reach to the deep seabed, the draft resolution would be almost uni-
formly opposed by industrialized countries.
It is possible that the requisite number of these countries would
request a Tribunal advisory opinion and, thus, stay an Assembly
vote.2 5 0  A fair reading of the draft treaty is that the Seabed Disputes
Chamber would be permitted to advise on the legality of the pro-
posed Assembly policy, despite the prohibition on its exercising juris-
diction over disputes concerning the discretionary powers of the As-
sembly. 2 5' Thus, an impartial Chamber could render an advisory
opinion that the Assembly's proposed general policy would not be in
249. See NG1, Art. 140 (activities in the Area shall benefit mankind, in particular
developing countries); ICNT, Art. 148 (effective participation of developing countries
shall be promoted); NG1, Art. 150(b) (a general policy of the Authority shall be to
expand opportunities for developing country participation). The key operative princi-
ple among these is Article 148 of the ICNT, which expressly restricts the Authority's
mandate to promote Third World participation to those measures "specifically pro-
vided for" in the convention. Since no provision of the draft treaty specifically ad-
dresses processing plant location requirements, the Group of 77's legal argument in
support of this position would be very weak.
250. ICNT, Art. 157(10), 190.
251. See id. Art. 191 (Chamber has no jurisdiction over Assembly's discretionary
decisions in disputes under Articles 187 and 189; advisory opinions are authorized
under Article 190).
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conformity with the convention. In this event, it might be very dif-
ficult for the Group of 77 to maintain solidarity in pressing through
the draft resolution. However, as discussed above, there is no assur-
ance that the Chamber will be an impartial body, nor is there any
guarantee that the Chamber will render the advisory opinion before
the end of the Assembly session. 252 If it does not, the Assembly, by
a simple majority, may decide to convene a "special session" the day
following the close of the regular session for the purpose of voting on
the draft resolution.
25 3
Assuming that the developed countries are unable to muster the
necessary one-quarter membership to request an advisory opinion, or
that the Chamber renders an unsound advisory opinion or fails to
submit the opinion in a timely manner, the overwhelming Group of
77 majority in the Assembly would proceed to adopt the proposed
general policy, even though every industrialized country votes against
it and a number of developing countries abstain.
254
2. Council Action.
At the next meeting of the Council, its developing country
members would propose that the Council adopt "specific policies to
implement the Assembly's resolution." 255 They would argue that the
Council is bound to follow the "supreme" Assembly's direction and
would propose, for example, that the Council take the following ac-
tions:
- direct the Rules and Regulations Commission to draft regulations
requiring all operators to locate processing plants in developing
countries; 256
- direct the Enterprise to plan to locate its first processing plant in
the Third World; 257 and
- direct the Technical Commission, pending the adoption of new
regulations, to insist in contract negotiations that all processing be
in developing countries or, alternatively, use the location of pro-
252. Although Article 190 of the ICNT requires the Chamber to render advisory
opinions "as a matter of urgency," the Chamber may be unable to fulfill a request
made late in the Assembly's session.
253. ICNT, Art. 157(7), (10).
254. Assembly resolutions are adopted by a two-thirds vote in which abstentions
do not count as negative votes. Id. Art. 157(6).
255. See id. Art. 160(1).
256. See id. Art. 160(2)(i), (xiv).
257. Id. Art, 160(2)(ix).
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cessing plants as one of the criteria in selecting among conflicting
applications for contracts.
258
If the Council's composition and voting procedures satisfied pre-
sent U.S. objectives, it is probable that the developed country Coun-
cil members would be able to successfully oppose these actions. 25 9
Under the present draft article, however, there would be no restraint
on the Council's acting to fully implement the processing plant loca-
tion requirement by taking the initial steps proposed by the develop-
ing country members.
260
3. Effective Implementation by Other Organs.
Assuming that the Council's composition and voting procedures
are favorable to the interests of the United States, direct implementa-
tion of the Assembly's general policy on processing plants by the
council would be blocked by the industrialized country members.
However, the policy could be indirectly implemented in the following
ways:
- First, the Enterprise has the inherent discretion to locate its pro-
cessing plants in developing countries and in fact, is directed by
the draft treaty to comply with the Assembly's general policies.
261
Under the best of circumstances, developed country members of
the Council would not have the voting strength to direct the En-
terprise to do otherwise,26 2 or to disapprove of an Enterprise plan
of work including processing in a developing country. 26 3
- Second, the Rules and Regulations Commission, which is domi-
nated by Third World members, would be free to propose draft
regulations in accordance with the Assembly's policy. 2 64 Even if
258. Id. Art. 160(2)(i), 163(2)(xiv). See discussion of acquiring maintaining access in
text accompanying note 2 supra.
259. See general discussion of the Council in text.
260. Under Article 159(7) of the ICNT, possibly ten blocking votes would be
required to prevent Council decisions; it is highly improbable that the United States
and like-minded countries could account for ten seats. Once the Council adopted
these decisions, there would be no opportunity for challenge in the Chamber, since
the decisions are either discretionary or concern the substance of regulations. ICNT,
Art. 191.
261. ICNT, Art. 169(1).
262. Id. Art. 160(2)(ix). See general discussion of the Council in text.
263. Id. Art. 160(2)(x).
264. One of the specifically authorized subjects of the Authority's operational regu-
lations concerrns the "direct participation of developing countries in ocean mining."
Id. Annex II, para. 11(a)(2)(xii). Also regulations may be those necessary to imple-
ment Council decisions pursuant to Article 150 (the general and resource policies of
the Authority). Id. para. 11(a)(4). In this instance, however, an industrialized country
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industrialized country Council members blocked their adoption,
the draft regulations would be available for the next session of the
Assembly. At that time, the Assembly would, without doubt, re-
quest the Council to amend the provisional regulations to include
the requirement, and it would be mandated that the Council com-
ply.26
5
- Third, the developing country-dominated Technical Commission
would have the inherent discretion to require contractors to locate
processing in developing countries as the price of access or to grant
priorities among conflicting applicants on this basis, even though a
very strict reading of the draft treaty would require the existence
of regulations on this point before the Commission should validly
impose such a requirement. 26 6 The reason is that developing
country Council members would, under all proposals, be in a posi-
tion to block Council directives which interfered with this Com-
mission practice, and applicants denied access as a result of these
practices would be unable to obtain judicial review. 267
- Fourth, the Technical Commission could indirectly achieve the
same result by forcing all contractors to engage in joint ventures
with the Enterprise in order to obtain access, 26 8 and the Enter-
prise, which is required to comply with the Assembly's policies,
2 6 9
would insist on basing processing in a developing country.
Thus, the existence of a Council that satisfied the present U.S.
objectives would not be an adequate safeguard against the Authority's
giving some effect to the general policy adopted by the Assembly in
this instance. On the other hand; effective improvement of the dis-
pute settlement provisions, which would allow contract applicants
prompt access to an impartial judicial body with the power to review
the Technical Commission's discretionary or other decisions in the
award of contracts, could substantially reduce the ability of the
veto of Council action implementing the Assembly's general policy concerning de-
veloping country participation under Article 150(b) of NCI would preclude regula-
tions pursuant to this authority. Id.
265. See ICNT, Art. 158(2)(xvi), 160(2)(xiv).
266. As a textual matter, the ICNT limits the Commission's discretion in contract
negotiations on the participation of developing countries to operational regulations
covering the subject and financial incentives also contained in regulations. Id. Annex
II, para. 5(d)(i), (ii); NG2, Annex II, para 7 septies. Selection from among conflicting
applications should be made on the basis of the same regulations. ICNT, Annex 11,
para. 5(g).
267. See ICNT, Art. 191 (exempting discretionary acts of the Technical Commis-
sion from review by the Seabed Disputes Chamber).
268. See NG1, Art. 151(3); ICNT, Annex II, para. 5(i). See also discussion of the
Enterprise in the text.
269. ICNT, Art. 169(1).
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bureaucracy to implement the Assembly's general policy in the ab-
sence of implementary regulations.
4. Importance of Adequate Dispute Settlement.
The key benefit of a "good" Council identified in the above
scenario would be to prevent the adoption of regulations embodying
the requirement that processing plants be located in Third World
countries. This safeguard, however, would not be very effective, un-
less the ability of the Authority's other organs to implement Assembly
policies is effectively curtailed by judicial review of all of the Authori-
ty's actions. Yet, improvements of the composition and voting proce-
dures of the Council and of the provisions for dispute settlement in
the draft treaty, would not completely eliminate the opportunity for
the Third World, through its domination of the Assembly, to satisfy
this hypothetical objective of developing country control over all sea-
bed nodule processing:
First, the Council only adopts regulations on a provisional basis,
while the Assembly has the power of final adoption. 270 If the Coun-
cil were to forward provisional regulations to the Assembly which did
not impose a requirement that all processing plants be located in de-
veloping countries, the Assembly, controlled by the Group of 77 col-
lectively, could request that the Council amend the provisional regu-
lations; arguably, the draft treaty requires the Council to comply with
the Assembly's request.
If the Council amended the regulations and the Assembly sub-
sequently approved such an amendment, the Seabed Disputes
Chamber, under the present draft treaty, would be barred from rul-
ing on their legality.2 71 Improvements to the dispute settlement ar-
ticles, permitting review of regulations, would remove this defect. If
the Council, due to an effective industrialized country veto, failed to
amend the regulations, the provisional regulations, without the pro-
cessing plant requirement, would continue in effect. 272  However,
the conflict created would damage the stability of the international
organization and, thus, might influence some industrialized country
Council members to seek resolution of the impasse. In this case, the
dispute settlement provisions could only be of assistance if they per-
270. Id. Art. 158(2)(xvi), 160(2)(xiv).
271. Id. Art. 191.
272. See id. Art. 160(2)(xiv).
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mitted the Chamber to decide political disputes between the Assem-
bly and Council, a highly unlikely outcome.
Second, the draft treaty permits the Assembly's general policy to
be effectively implemented through regulations providing financial in-
centives to contractors who located their operations in developing
countries. 273 It would no doubt be more difficult to maintain indus-
trialized country solidarity in blocking regulations that, while undesir-
able, are nonetheless in conformity with the convention, as opposed
to regulations which violate the convention. Thus, there is a high risk
that the Council would not safeguard against the adoption of tax re-
ductions which have the net effect of forcing contractors to locate
their processing plants in developing countries. Moreover, improve-
ments to the dispute settlement provisions permitting judicial review
of regulations and the Authority's discretionary acts would not pre-
vent the de facto implementation of the processing location require-
ment under tax incentive regulations. 27
4
Third, any prudent private company considering ocean mining,
when confronted with the Assembly's initial adoption of its general
policy, would probably feel forced to plan its operation so as to locate
its processing plant in a developing country before it ever applied for
a contract. Such a country would recognize that, even in the event
that it acquired a contract for operations which did not comply with
the Assembly's policy, investment made pursuant to that contract
would be very insecure.
The most obvious reason for this instability would be the risk
that subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, the provisional reg-
ulations would be amended pursuant to an Assembly directive. In the
most extreme case, the contract could be terminated, unless the con-
tractor then agreed to build his processing plant in the Third World.
Of equal seriousness would be the risk that if he did not construct
onshore facilities in a developing country, he would be unable to
benefit from tax reductions later enacted in revised regulations im-
plementing the Assembly's policy.
273. NG2, Annex II, para 7 septies.
274. In the event that regulations granting tax reductions for the locations of pro-
cessing plants in developing countries were held invalid because the Authority's
powers do not extend to landbased operations, the regulations could simply be
redrafted to provide the same benefits for contractors who joint venture with develop-
ing countries or the Enterprise. See NG2, Annex II, para. 7(d), 7 septies. As a practi-
cal matter, the joint venture tax reduction would have the same impact as a proces-
sing location requirement, since it would force contractors to negotiate with Third
World partners who, in turn, could force location of processing plants in their ter-
ritories.
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A less obvious reason for this insecurity concerns the contractor's
daily routine relationship with the international regulators-a rela-
tionship that in and of itself goes a long way toward shaping the over-
all investment climate. If a project were viewed by the members of
the Technical Commission and the Secretariat comprising the staff of
inspectors as in violation of the Assembly's policy, the prospects for
fair and reasonable regulation would diminish. In a system where
prompt and effective judicial review of contract disputes is frequently
unavailable, where the contractor's government may not retain its
seat on the Council and if it does so has inadequate voting strength to
properly supervise the international bureaucracy, and where the same
bureaucracy holds absolute control over whether the operator will
ever obtain a second ocean mining contract, the Authority's "good
will" becomes just as indispensable to a secure and attractive invest-
ment climate as the written terms of the contract.
A second or "resumed" meeting of the Seventh Session of the
Conference in August-September 1978 produced additional revisions
to the draft articles contained in the ICNT, which became available
too late to have been discussed in this article in any detail. 275 In any
event, the status of these most recently revised articles is even more
uncertain than that of the revisions which emerged from the Geneva
session in the spring of 1978.276 Moreover, these revisions, if they
are retained, would have little effect on the analysis of the draft treaty
presented in the preceding discussion.
The most substantial changes to the ICNT considered by the
negotiating groups during the resumed Seventh Session in New York
concern the establishment and functions of the subsidiary organs of
the Council of the Authority. 277 If they were to be incorporated into
the draft treaty, these revised articles would have the effect of: (1)
Decreasing the powers of the Technical Commission in favor of
Council decisionmaking; 2 78 and (2) eliminating the Rules and Regula-
275. During the resumed session, Negotiating Group 1 produced revised articles
concerning the "Basic Conditions of Exploration and Exploitation." LOS Conf. Doc.
NG1/13, Sept. 12, 1978. Negotiating Group 2 produced a revision of the "'Financial
Terms of Contracts" provision. LOS Conf. Doc. NG2/10, Sept. 13, 1978. And
Negotiating Group 3 produced revised texts concerning the subsidiary organs of the
Council. LOS Conf. Doe. NG3/4, Sept. 13, 1978.
276. For example, the chairman of Negotiating Group 1 has explained that certain
of these new draft articles will need to be revised further. LOS Conf. Doc. NG1/13/
Add. 1, Sept. 14, 1978 (revised articles in LOS Conf. Doc. NG1/13 do not have same
status as those in LOS Conf. Doc. NG1/10/Rev. 1).
277. LOS Conf. Doe. NG3/4, Sept. 13, 1978 (revising Arts. 160-63 of the ICNT).
278. Id. Arts. 160, 163.
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tions Commission and locating its functions in the Technical Commis-
sion. 279
The first change is not very encouraging to the prospective ocean
mining investor. The relocation of political or "executive" functions in
the Council may serve to diminish the risk that a politically-
motivated, developing country-controlled Technical Commission
would take actions inimical to the security of investments made under
contracts. 280  Such actions are less likely to be undertaken by a
Council in which both highly industrialized country members and de-
veloping country members exercise a collective veto, as proposed by
the United States. 281  However, ocean miners will no doubt also re-
quire affirmative decisionmaking from the regulating body in order to
conduct efficient operations under the regime, and the risk of delay
and stalemate in Council decisionmaking may be almost as serious as
the risk that the technical experts who are members of the commis-
sions will transgress their mandate and enter the political arena.
Furthermore, the second major change proposed in these draft
articles, the elimination of the Rules and Regulations Commission,
will probably not be well received by those who express an interest
in ensuring sound international regulation of ocean mining activities,
particularly for the purpose of protecting the quality of the marine
environment. 'Experience tends to demonstrate that combining the
functions of rule-making and contracting in the same body results in
less effective regulations of the concerned industry.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In order to justify the billion dollar investment ocean miners are
considering, the international investment climate must undergo sig-
nificant improvement. The most effective means of stabilizing the
legal and political uncertainties surrounding recovery operations on
the deep seabed is through a universally accepted law of the sea
treaty. The criticisms of the draft treaty regime contained in this arti-
cle are presented in the hope that the prospects for reaching such an
agreement might be advanced.
When confronted with the types of criticism found in this article,
many developing countries will respond by suggesting that the pri-
vate companies of industrialized countries should "trust" the Interna-
279. Id. Art. 163.
280. See note 223-34 supra and accompanying text.
281. See note 207 supra and accompanying text.
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tional Seabed Authority and, in particular, the developing countries
who will dominate it. The underlying rationale for this trust, they will
argue, is the universally shared desire to see the common heritage of
mankind developed and the practical recognition that such develop-
ment can only occur through the activities of those companies which
presently have the technology and wherewithal to do the job. These
countries may be sincerely puzzled that this argument is unpersua-
sive. To the companies, however, it seems very clear why a billion
dollar investment cannot be made on the basis of wishful thinking, as
such thinking is controverted by virtually all of the empirical evi-
dence available:
First, for over ten years, a handful of countries producing raw
materials have managed to prevent agreement on any treaty which
would tend to facilitate private investment. In the past, attempts have
been made in the negotiation to resolve land-based producer con-
cerns through fixed production limits in the treaty, in order to elimi-
nate pressures to deter seabed development for production control
reasons through the so-called backdoor approach to production
control-misuse of discretion, onerous rules and regulations, red
tape, and delay. This strategy has not been successful to date and
may never be so. It cannot be rationally assumed that a new Interna-
tional Seabed Authority will be free of the manipulative influence of
the land-based producers, when they have been so successful for ten
years.
Second, the basic principles now embodied in the draft treaty
conform closely to those of the new international economic order ad-
vocated by the Third World. While the developing countries may feel
this new philosophy is just, surely they understand why a private
investor is intimidated by it. The concern that developing countries
in their collective control of the Seabed Authority may be hostile to-
wards multinational corporations from industrialized countries in ful-
fillment of new international economic order philosophies is not an
idle one; the Conference's experience has demonstrated that the
Third World as a political unit is as hostile to private enterprise as its
most radical elements, notwithstanding the wide range of represented
economic philosophies and systems that should result in moderation.
Third, the draft treaty contains the clearest possible signal that
private enterprise should be eliminated from the deep seabed as soon
as it has surrendered its know-how and technology to a supranational
mining company that will have a monopoly over seabed resources.
Wherever possible, the Third World-dominated Authority will dis-
criminate in favor of direct exploitation by the Third World's prodigy,
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the Enterprise. While some may argue that the influence of land-
based producers and the importance of Third World ideology may
diminish once the Law of the Sea Conference is over, there is little
chance that favoritism for the Enterprise will disappear. In fact, it
will probably increase when the Enterprise comes into existence and
begins to pursue its own bureaucratic expansionism.
Finally, there is a basic distinction between investing in a mining
project in a Third World country and on the deep seabed that illus-
trates with clarity why potential investors cannot assume the risk that
the Seabed Authority may use its discretionary powers unwisely.
Many developing countries anxious to attract foreign investment for
their industrialization have developed detailed investment laws and
policies designed to establish stable and cooperative long-term rela-
tionships with private companies. These arrangements are founded
always on the principle that the foreign investor must benefit the
overall political, economic, and social objectives established by the
host country. To the extent that they have been successful in attract-
ing capital, it is because investors can study the host country's politi-
cal system, ascertain its reliability, review other investment disputes
which that country has had with foreign investors and determine their
root causes, and finally, because host countries share with foreign in-
vestors a common objective-to develop their resources so as to
maximize the economic benefits available for distribution between the
investor and the country.
In contrast, the draft treaty on the law of the sea would establish
an unknown governing authority, with no past track record, which
would have as much discretion as a sovereign state. Moreover, this
regime is being proposed for an area not owned by any one country
or entity, and therefore, direct economic benefits flowing to a unified
body politic from the development of seabed resources are not ex-
perienced by individual developing countries. Indeed, if manganese
nodules had been found in a sovereign state, it would be very likely
that arrangements would already exist for the development of these
resources. In short, the draft treaty texts would have to contain sub-
stantial incentives for private company participation in ocean mining
before it would be possible to overcome the general conviction that
investing in an area governed by the Third World collectively is risk-
ier than investing in any single developing country.
The best that can be said for the draft treaty in its present form
is that the Authority will have to treat at least a few companies well
in order to get the Enterprise on its feet. It is possible that, among
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the thirty companies now active in ocean mining, one, two, or three
might actually operate profitably through partnership with the Enter-
prise. But no one company can know whether it would be among the
chosen, and in the absence of the establishment of some alternative
investment climate during the immediate future, these companies
will all be forced to abandon their projects long before they would
ever be in a position to vie with each other for favors from the Au-
thority, assuming that any of them would be prepared to rise to that
bait.
This article has attempted to set forth in detail the numerous
questions which a prudent investor would pose before investing
under a law of the sea treaty. It explains why the draft treaty's
answers to those questions are unsatisfactory to such an investor. If
the international community really wants the resources of the seabed
developed for the benefit of all mankind, these questions will need to
be answered by a treaty which, on its face, demonstrates fairness,
objectivity, and common sense regulation and administration. None of
these factors is present today.
If this treaty, or one which closely resembles it, is adopted by
the Law of the Sea Conference, there can be virtually no doubt that
the treaty will not secure the necessary ratifications to bring it into
force. As a result, the cause of advancing international cooperation
through the creation of new global institutions will be dealt a blow
from which the international community will not easily recover in this
century.
For this reason, concerned nations need to rededicate them-
selves to achieving common agreement on the fundamental principles
which will govern the exploitation of the deep seabed and its re-
sources. Unquestionably, these resources should be developed for the
benefit of all mankind. But the foundation of the common heritage
concept must, by general consensus, be defined as the collective ad-
ministration and encouragement of deep seabed resource develop-
ment by all nations, with each nation free to participate in such de-
velopment on terms compatible with national needs and individual
economic philosophies. If this underlying principle is agreed upon, it
should be possible for the Law of the Sea Conference to repair the
draft treaty regime so that the market-oriented economies, which
depend on private initiative and investment to supply vital raw mate-
rials, can be confident that the final regime will induce economic de-
velopment through private enterprise.
